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Dansk abstrakt
Ph.d.-afhandlingen består af fire selvstændige kapitler inden for det transportøkonomiske
område. Kapitlerne omhandler emner som modellering af adfærdsmæssige reaktioner
på rejsetidsvariabilitet, måling af omkostningerne i forbindelse med rejsetidsvariabilitet,
arbejdsmarkedskonsekvenser som følge af ændrede pendlingsomkostninger og anvendelse
af diskretevalg modeller til at undersøge variationer i betalinsvilligheden for rejseinforma-
tionssystemer. Det centrale emne, der forbinder kapitlerne, er pendlingsomkostninger. De
vigtigste resultater i afhandlingen er følgende:
• Med brug of danske data udfordres den teoretiske ækvivalens mellem to metoder
til måling af omkostninger i forbindelse med rejsetidsvariabilitet. Resultaterne fra
analysen støtter ikke denne teoretiske ækvivalens (Kapitel 1).
• I en model, hvor to personer pendler til et fælles møde, viser kapitel 2 valget af et
optimalt mødetidspunkt og at en forbedret forudsigelighed af rejsetiden er en fordel
for begge personer.
• Kapitel 3 omhandler brug af diskretevalg modeller til at undersøge betalinsvilligheden
for avancerede rejseinformationssystemer på tværs af individer. Analysen viser, at
de begrænsninger der er indbyggede i modellen, kan være afgørende for resultaterne.
• Det påvistes ligeledes, at når en typisk dansk virksomhed flytter 10 km væk, får
flytningen 2% af virksomhedens ansatte til at forlade virksomheden inden for en
periode på tre år (Kapitel 4).
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Introduction and summary
The PhD thesis consists of four self-contained chapters in the area of Transport Economics.
The main aim of the thesis is not to produce a single message which is supported by all
four chapters. Rather, each chapter is written to make a contribution of its own. The
thesis covers a wide range of issues such as modelling behavioural reactions to travel
time variability, the measurement of the cost of travel time variability, the labour market
implication of changes in commute costs, and the application of discrete choice models to
investigate variations in willingness to pay for travel information systems across individuals
and the implication of model assumptions on the estimated distribution.
Chapter 1 is titled: “Testing the slope model of scheduling preferences with stated
preference data”, and is a joint work with Katrine Hjorth and Jeppe Rich. This study
used a stated preference data to challenge the theoretical equivalence of two methods for
measuring the value of travel time variability: the slope model of the scheduling approach
(Fosgerau & Engelson, 2011) against its reduced form model. The analysis is based on data
from two choice experiments that are identical except one has a fixed departure time while
the other allows respondents to choose their optimal departure time. According to the
scheduling model, the two experiments yield the same result if travellers can freely choose
departure time to maximise utility, and if the distribution of travel times is independent of
departure times. It turns out that the empirical results in this paper do not support the
theoretical equivalence of the two models as the implied value of travel time variability
under the reduced form model is an order of magnitude larger. This finding is robust and
is in line with a recent Swedish study by Börjesson et al. (2012). Because of data better
suited for the analysis, we ruled out some potential explanations lined up by past research
for the observed discrepancy between the two models. Although the similarity of results
across studies could suggest the presence of a more fundamental problem in estimating
the valuation of travel time variability based on data from hypothetical experiments, it
is recommended to test the equivalence of the models based on real life data before we
can rule out hypothetical bias as a potential explanation for the discrepancy. (A paper
based on this chapter was presented at the 3rd Symposium for the European Association
for Research in Transportation, Leeds, UK, 10-12 September, 2014.)
Chapter 2 is titled “Valuation of travel time variability with endogenous scheduling
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of a meeting time”, and is a joint work with Mogens Fosgerau. The chapter involves a
theoretical model to examine the choice of an optimal meeting time in a situation where
individuals can freely choose meeting times. It extends the model of Fosgerau et al. (2014)
by introducing a notion of a designated meeting time and a penalty that may be imposed
when one arrives later than the meeting time. Such a meeting time can be obtained as
an agreement outcome in a bargaining process over potential meeting times. The model
considers two individuals who choose departure and meeting times in the presence of
uncertain travel times for a trip towards a joint meeting. An important feature of the
model is the physical property that a meeting starts only when both individuals arrive
at the destination. The study shows the existence of a unique optimal meeting time and
a unique Nash equilibrium in departure times. It finds that an increase in the variance
of the difference between individual travel times is costly for both individuals. It also
find that an increase in travel time variance of one person is costly for both. Compared
to Fosgerau et al. (2014), the introduction of a lateness penalty allows an additional
mechanism through which a change in travel time variance of one individual affects the
pay-off of both individuals. (Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 2nd
Symposium of the European Association for Research in Transportation, Stockholm, 4-6
Sept, 2013; and at the ITEA’s Annual Conference and Summer School on Transportation
Economics, Toulouse, 2–6 June, 2014.)
This paper is related the scheduling model in chapter 1: both models consider scheduling
choices in the presence of travel time variability. They differ in two important respects:
First, whereas the model in this chapter allows individuals to choose a meeting time, the
slope model assumes a fixed arrival time. Moreover, while the slope model takes scheduling
choices merely as a personal matter, the model in this chapter allows strategic interaction
in scheduling choice. As a result, the slope model does not capture the effect of improved
variability of travel times for one person on another.
Chapter 3 is titled:“Advanced methods make a difference: A case of the distribution
of willingness to pay for advanced traveller information systems”. This study is concerned
with the use of discrete choice models to estimate the distribution of willingness to pay for
advanced traveller information systems and the implication of certain model assumptions
on the estimated distribution of willingness to pay. The study uses a flexible estimation
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method based on data from a stated choice experiment designed to measure the willingness
to pay for several types of information that an advanced traveller information system
can provide. Different models were estimates that vary in terms of restrictions embodied.
While simpler and relatively more advanced models yield nicely dispersed distribution
for willingness to pay, this distribution ceased to exist when some restrictions are set
free. The less restrictive model fitted the data better, and in this model, which combines
the latent class and mixed logit models, it turns out that the data do not reveal any
dispersion in the willingness to pay for advanced traveller information systems. Results
indicate that a significant share of individuals is unwilling to pay for advanced traveller
information systems and that willingness to pay is tightly distributed among those who are
willing to pay a positive amount. Findings in this study illustrate the importance of model
specification testing, and that results regarding the estimated distribution of willingness to
pay can be highly dependent on restrictions built into the model. (A paper based on this
chapter is under review at Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies, and
was presented at the 94th Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board (TRB),
Washington, D.C., 11-14 January 2015.)
Chapter 4 is titled “The effect of a firm’s relocation distance on worker turnover”,
and is a joint work with Ismir Mulalic, Jos van Ommeren and Ninette Pilegaard. Using a
matched worker-firm data from Denmark for the years 2000-2007, this study examines
whether and how much a firm’s relocation distance is related to worker turnover. Firm
relocation alters the pattern of commutes to workers: some workers benefit from shortened
commutes while other face lengthened commutes. The costs of residential mobility and
long distance commuting could induce those whose face lengthened commutes to move
jobs. Those who faced longer commutes incur higher commuting costs; and they can
minimise these costs by moving residence to shorten commutes or by moving to a nearby
job. When the costs of residential mobility and long distance commuting are higher, job
mobility becomes a more attractive proposition.
The analysis finds a positive and significant but moderate effect of relocation distance
on worker turnover. This effect is robust to the inclusion of firm level characteristics and
year and municipality fixed effects. Results in this chapter establish that, on average, a
10 km increase in relocation distance leads to a 2–4 percent increase in the annual rate
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of worker turnover at the firm level over a period of three years, including the year of
relocation. The estimated effect is stronger in the first year after relocation and pales
away after the third year as workers more or less fully adjust to the relocation. It is
not surprising that we obtained a smaller effect since, first most firms relocated locally.
Second, the high rate of job mobility in Denmark means that workers expect to be mobile
in the labour market; hence, it may matter less when their firm relocates. Moreover, it is
possible that workers knew about the relocation decision and left the firm in the years and
months before the relocation. The study also examines whether the distance of relocation
captures the effect of changes at the firm because of the relocation. Results indicate that,
after controlling for relocation distance, firm relocation has no significant effect on worker
turnover.
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Abstract
This paper used a stated preference data to challenge the theoretical equivalence
of two methods for measuring the value of travel time variability: the ‘slope model’
of the scheduling approach against its reduced form model. The analysis is based on
data from two choice experiments that are identical except one has a fixed departure
time while the other allows respondents to choose their optimal departure time.
When departure times are optimally chosen and the distribution of travel times
is independent of departure times, the two methods are theoretically equivalent,
hence are expected to yield similar results. The empirical results in this paper do
not support the theoretical equivalence of the two models as the implied value of
travel time variability under the reduced form model is an order of magnitude larger.
This finding, which is robust to certain model assumptions, is in line with a recent
Swedish study by Böjesson, Eliasson and Franklin. Because of data better suited for
the analysis, we ruled out some potential explanations lined up by past research for
the observed discrepancy between the two models.
Keywords: travel time variability; value of reliability; the slope model; scheduling prefer-
ences
JEL code: R41
∗A previous version of this paper was presented at the 3rd Symposium of the European Association for
Research in Transportation, Leeds, UK, 10-12 September, 2014.
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1 Introduction
Valuation of travel time variability (TTV) or reliability has received much attention in
the transport literature in recent years. Most empirical studies measuring preferences for
TTV use stated preference (SP) data and apply one of two approaches: The scheduling
approach or the reduced form approach, which also referred to as the mean-variance or
mean-standard deviation approach or similar. Whereas the scheduling approach infers the
valuation of TTV from individuals’ preferences against being late or early relative to a
desired arrival time, in the reduced form model, the valuation of TTV is directly linked to
specific measures of TTV such as the variance or standard deviation of travel times.
Under certain theoretical assumptions, the two approaches can be shown to be equivalent
(Fosgerau & Karlstrom, 2010; Fosgerau & Engelson, 2011). However, empirical research
reveals that the two approaches could provide very different results (see, e.g. Hollander,
2006; Börjesson et al., 2012), either because the theoretical assumptions do not hold or
because the approaches tend to be applied on different types of SP data. Since the transport
literature is yet to agree on a preferred method for presenting TTV in SP experiments
and measuring preferences, it is important to understand why the approaches differ and
possibly point to specific theoretical assumptions that are too restrictive or address specific
differences in the SP experiments that have critical impact on the estimates.
In this paper, we compare the two approaches using data from a Danish SP survey aimed
at valuing TTV. Our analysis is closely related to a recent paper by Börjesson et al. (2012);
however, it differs with regard to data: using data better suited for comparing the methods,
we can rule out some of the potential explanations for the observed difference between
the two methods in their analysis. Because they estimated the scheduling model based
on data without TTV, they could not rule out whether this contributed to the observed
discrepancy between the two models. The two SP games we designed to estimate the two
models are much more similar to each other than the two games used in Börjesson et al.
(2012): Both our SP games involve TTV and use the same presentation of the distribution
of travel times. The only difference between the games is that one includes a departure
time attribute, while the other allows respondents to choose their preferred departure time.
Compared to Börjesson et al. (2012), the similarity between the two SP games narrows
down the list of potential factors differentiating the two models.
A further contribution of this paper is that it examines whether the results in
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Börjesson et al. (2012) who sampled users of scheduled services, namely train and metro,
also holds for car commuters. Moreover, we tested different ways of deriving the ‘ideal
arrival time’, a key concept in the scheduling model, from the data to probe if this affects
the hypothesised equivalence between scheduling and reduced form models.1
Our analysis is based on the form of scheduling model developed by Vickrey (1973)
and later analysed by Tseng & Verhoef (2008) and Fosgerau & Engelson (2011). This
scheduling model considers journey scheduling choices in the presence of uncertain travel
times, in the case where departure time choice is continuous. It assumes that travellers
have a specific marginal utility of being at the origin and another marginal utility of being
at the destination, and that both marginal utilities vary over time of day, such that at
one point in time, t0, it becomes more desirable to be at the destination than at the
origin. Travellers are assumed to choose their departure time optimally by maximising
their expected utility, given the distribution of travel time. We denote the relation between
expected utility, departure time and the travel time distribution as the scheduling model,
while the reduced form model denotes the relation between the optimal expected utility
(assuming optimal departure time) and the travel time distribution.
In line with Fosgerau & Engelson (2011) we assume that the utility rates are simple
linear functions of time of day. This yields a simple model, referred to as the ‘slope model’,
which has property that the theoretical cost of TTV is proportional to the variance of
travel times.
We use SP data from two different choice experiments (games). Both experiments are
from a survey among Danish car drivers commuting to work in the morning and each SP
game consists of six binary choices between travel alternatives characterised by a set of
attributes. The attributes include a travel time distribution with two possible outcomes
and their probabilities of occurrence. In the first SP game, the only attributes are journey
cost and the travel time distribution, while the second SP game in addition includes a
departure time attribute. We use the first SP game to estimate the parameters of the
reduced form model and the second SP game to estimate the preference parameters for
the scheduling model.
The empirical analysis in this paper does not support the hypothesised equivalence
1The ideal arrival time is a point in time at which it is preferred to be at destination rather than at
the origin. Thus, it corresponds to the arrival time in the hypothetical case where travel time is zero with
certainty.
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between the scheduling and reduced form models. The two methods are shown to yield
very different results, as the value of TTV differs by a factor of at least 12, and as much
as 48 in some cases. Our result complements Börjesson et al. (2012) who suggest three
explanations of the discrepancy between scheduling and reduced form models:
• In departure time choices without TTV, information about actual arrival time is
given with certainty, so respondents are in principle able to reschedule their activities
according to this known outcome, thus changing their preferences for being at the
origin/destination at a specific time.
• The scheduling model does not allow for a disutility of uncertainty per se: The only
thing that matters is when the respondent departs and arrives, and the uncertainty
therefore enters through the expectation of the utility of arriving at a specific time.
However, it may be that TTV affects the perception of travel time or the travel
situation as such, and thus affects preferences in other ways than through the
expectation of the utility of arriving at a specific time.2
• Policy bias and focus bias: As in all SP experiments, there is a risk that respondents
try to answer the SP questions in a way that they think will cause certain desirable
effects – rather than being in accordance with their intrinsic preferences. If this
so-called policy bias works differently in the two SP games it may cause a difference
between the scheduling and reduced form models. Another source of error in SP
experiments is focus bias, which arises when respondents focus on some specific
attributes while ignoring or providing less attention to others. The two experiments
in Börjesson et al. (2012) are quite different, as one is about preferences for depart-
ing/arriving at specific times known with certainty and the other is about the risk
of delays. The delay attributes (probabilities and durations) may be more complex
to interpret and relate to the travellers’ own experience, and this may result in a
focus bias in the delay experiment.
Since both our SP games involve TTV, the first explanation can be ruled out, albeit
only partially since the fixed departure time attribute in one of the SP games provides
some scope for rescheduling. Compared to a situation where arrival times are known, a
2Börjesson et al. (2012) mention three examples of such an effect: ‘Anxiety costs’ (stemming from the
traveller disliking not knowing what is going to happen), ’decision costs’ (TTV makes it harder for the
traveller to determine his optimal departure time), and ’contingency planning costs’ (TTV potentially
forces the traveller to develop a contingency plan in case he arrives very late).
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fixed departure time offers smaller scope for rescheduling since arrival time is uncertain
due to TTV. The second explanation may still apply to some extent, if the disutility of
uncertainty per se is captured differently in the two models. However, since both games
involve TTV, such an effect is expected to be smaller than in the study by Börjesson et al.
(2012). The third explanation may also still apply, but only to some degree since the two
SP games are only slightly different. In any case, it would be expected that the effect is
smaller in our case than in the study by Börjesson et al. (2012).
To aid future TTV valuation studies (in selecting appropriate methods), it is relevant
to discuss another line of explanation, which relates to the appropriateness of the applied
scheduling model and the other theoretical assumptions we impose in our analysis. Clearly,
if the underlying assumptions in the scheduling model are incorrect, then the derived
equivalence between scheduling models and reduced form models will not hold. However,
even though the theoretical model may be too simple to capture all facets of real-life
departure time choices, we have confidence that it captures some of the main effects, and
it may still serve as a useful approximation. An obvious source of misspecification would
be that the simple linear form of the marginal utilities is unrealistic for departure times
far from t0. It may however prove hard to remedy this, if one desires to retain a tractable
functional form yielding closed form expressions of the expected utility function.3
Even if the theoretical scheduling model is correct, the assumption of optimal departure
time choice which is necessary for the equivalence between scheduling and reduced form
models, may be unrealistic in the context of SP data. However, the reduced form model
may still be a good approximation of real-life behaviour where travellers can adjust their
departure time on their daily commute until they reach an optimal solution. As such, we
would have expected it to also be an acceptable approximation when applied to SP choices,
at least for experienced travellers who consider the effect of their departure time choice,
and may have developed some intuition or rule of thumb regarding the best departure time
choice for their daily commute. The magnitude of the discrepancy between our scheduling
and reduced form models, however, seems to reject this.
Finally, even if the scheduling and the reduced form models are indeed equivalent, the
estimated scheduling preference parameters are likely to depend somewhat on how we
3 Hjorth et al. (forthcoming), e.g., run into severe identification problems when attempting to estimate
scheduling models with exponential marginal utility rates, which is one of the few continuous forms of
marginal utility rates yielding closed form expressions of the expected utility function.
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derive t0. Wrong assumptions would cause a misspecification that causes the results of our
scheduling model to be unreliable. This issue has so far been investigated very little. We
test different ways to derive t0 from the data to examine if this affects the discrepancy
between scheduling and reduced form models. Results from our analysis indicate that,
though the implied value of reliability, to some extent, depends on the derivation of t0,
this does not explain the discrepancy between the two models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the theoretical
framework underlying our analysis. Section 3 describes the survey carried out and the
resulting data used in the analysis. In section 4 we derive the empirical models used to
estimate preferences, and in section 5 we discuss results and empirical findings. Section 6
concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
This section summarises the main assumptions and results in the scheduling model, which
forms the basis of our analysis. The model is essentially equal to that of Fosgerau & Engelson
(2011), except that we explicitly model how preferences can be heterogeneous across trav-
ellers.
2.1 The scheduling model
Our setting is a traveller making a journey from home to work, facing a risky travel time,
i.e. travel time is not known with certainty in advance. For an outcome T (realised travel
time) of the distribution of travel times, the traveller’s utility is
U = −c−
∫ t0
d
H(t)dt−
∫ d+T
t0
W (t)dt, (1)
where d is departure time, c is the monetary cost of the trip, H(t) is the marginal utility
of being at home at time t instead of travelling, W (t) is the marginal utility of being at
work at time t rather than travelling, and t0 is a time at which H and W intersecting.
Figure 1 illustrates t0 and utility rates H(t) and W (t). We assume that H and W
are continuous, and that H is non-increasing and W (t) is non-decreasing. With these
assumptions, t0 can be interpreted as the point in time at which it becomes more attractive
to be at work than at home provided that the commute trip can be made in no time.
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time 
MU (travelling) 
MU (dest) 
MU (home) 
W(t) 
t
0
 td+T td 
H(t) 
Figure 1: Illustration of scheduling preferences, t0 and utility rates H(t) and W (t).
The point of intersection t0 may vary over travellers, as different people are likely to
have different time restrictions regarding obligations at home and at work. It is assumed
that, for a given t0, H(t) and W (t) are linear and depend only on the difference between
time t and time t0:
H(t) = γ0 + β1(t− t0),
W (t) = γ0 + γ1(t− t0).
(2)
We assume that β1 ≤ 0 and γ1 ≥ 0 such that H is non-increasing and W (t) is non-
decreasing. This formulation implies that the additional marginal utility from being at
work at time t′ compared to time t0 is independent of clock time as such - it depends only
on t′ − t0. Similarly for the marginal utility of being at home.
When there is travel time variability, travel time T is a random variable. We assume the
traveller knows the distribution of travel times and, based this distribution, can compute
the expected utility associated with different departure times. Substituting (2) in (1) and
manipulating, the expected utility becomes
E(U) = −
(
c+ γ1 − β12 (d− t0)
2 + (γ0 + γ1(d− t0))µT + γ12 E(T
2)
)
. (3)
where µT is the mean of the travel time distribution. We refer to this model as Model
1. In our analysis, we are also interested in the special case where H(t) is constant, i.e.
β1 = 0. We refer to this special case as Model 2. This model is particularly interesting as
it allows a simpler expression for the value of time.
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2.2 The reduced form model
In this section, we present the reduced forms of Models 1 and 2 and the values of travel
time and reliability they imply. The reduced form models are obtained from the full
scheduling model by further assuming that the traveller chooses departure time optimally
(i.e. to maximise expected utility). Differentiating (3) with respect to d and setting it
equal to zero yields the optimal departure time:
d∗ = t0 − γ1
γ1 − β1µT (4)
Inserting (4) into (3), and noting that E (T 2) = σ2T + µ2T where σ2T is the variance of the
travel time distribution, we see that the optimal expected utility in Model 1, given the
cost c and the travel time distribution, is
E(U∗) = −
(
c+ γ0µT − β1γ12(γ1 − β1)µ
2
T +
γ1
2 σ
2
T
)
. (5)
The optimal expected utility depends on the mean and variance of the travel time
distribution. Hence, in this model, the value of travel time (VTT) and the value of travel
time variability (VTTV) are given by:
V TT = ∂E(U
∗)/∂µT
∂E(U∗)/∂c = γ0 −
β1γ1
(γ1 − β1)µT , (6)
V TTV = ∂E(U
∗)/∂σ2T
∂E(U∗)/∂c =
γ1
2 . (7)
The reduced form of Model 2 is similar, except β1 = 0, i.e. the optimal expected utility is
E(U∗) = −
(
c+ γ0µT +
γ1
2 σ
2
T
)
, (8)
and the values of travel time and variability are:
V TT = γ0, (9)
V TTV = γ12 . (10)
Interestingly, the values of travel time and reliability inferred from this model do not
depend on the characteristics of the distribution of travel time.
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3 Data and survey design
3.1 The stated preference survey
The data we use are from a Danish stated preference (SP) survey regarding TTV and the
choice of departure time. The survey was carried out using an Internet questionnaire in
the spring of 2014. The recruitment of respondents was handled by a market research
agency, Epinion, using their existing Internet panel.
Rather than being representative of the population, the aim of the survey was to aid
the development of an appropriate scheduling model to use in the valuation of TTV. It
was therefore targeted at morning commute trips for car drivers. This is to achieve a
relatively homogeneous sample of travellers and trips in terms of scheduling preferences, to
exclude non-traders, and to avoid complicated issues related to scheduled public transport
services. We aimed to sample approximately 1000 individuals.
We used stratified sampling to sample two roughly equally sized subsamples: Subsample
1 consisting of travellers who are used to commuting to work in congested conditions, and
subsample 2 consisting of travellers who are used to commuting to work in uncongested
conditions. The purpose of sampling equally from these two groups is to make sure we
observe sufficient respondents who are used to congestion on their daily commute – which
is rare in many parts of the country. We note that this stratified sampling likely causes the
overall sample to be biased compared to the population of car commuters, and that this
has to be handled somehow if data are used to estimate a representative national value
of TTV. However, for research purposes, we believe our sampling strategy to be useful,
because it provides a large subsample of people who are actually used to congestion and
therefore possibly may have a different understanding and experience with the type of
choices presented in the stated preference exercises.
The survey uses customised Internet questionnaires, containing a series of questions
related to the traveller’s most recent morning trip to work (the reference trip), e.g.:
• Travel time experienced on this day,
• Number of stops along the way, their duration, and whether these stops involved
restrictions on time of day,
• Restrictions regarding departure time from home or arrival time at work,
• How often such a trip was made within the last month and the range of experienced
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travel times,
• What the traveller considers to be his ’normal’ travel time and departure time,
• What the traveller considers to be his free flow travel time (without queues or
congestion), and his preferred departure time in the hypothetical situation where
there were never queues or congestion,
• The cost of the trip (the respondent was instructed to focus on the variable costs only
and the questionnaire computed the cost based on the stated trip distance and car
fuel type, using default average values for fuel prices and depreciation/maintenance
costs, but allowing respondents to alter these default values if they disagreed).
The survey contains two SP games, each consisting of 6 binary choices. The first
game involves trade-offs between travel time, TTV and monetary travel cost, while the
second also includes departure time. Figures 5 and 6 in the Appendix show examples of
choice screens from each game. An overall aim in the survey was to keep the SP trade-offs
as simple as possible, and hence TTV is described using travel time distributions that
can attain only two values, a low value with probability (1 − p) and a high value with
probability p. The probability of an outcome is phrased as ‘x out of 10 times, travel time
is ... minutes’, to avoid direct mentioning of the concept of probabilities. We deliberately
avoid the phrasing of travel times as ’normal travel time’ and ‘delay’, to minimize effects
of potential reference-dependence and loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
The levels of travel time, cost and departure time attributes are defined by pivoting
around reference values, which are the experienced travel time, computed cost, and
departure time of the reference trip. In order to ensure meaningful variation in the
attributes, the survey was targeted at travellers whose reference trip lasted at least 10
minutes and cost at least 6 DKK.4
In all choices, one of the two departure time attributes is equal to the reference value,
while the other is either smaller (earlier) or larger (later), and the number of earlier and
later departures is balanced in the design. Departure time attributes are presented as
clock times, rounded to the nearest 5 minutes to ease comparisons.
The cost attributes follow a similar pattern: One if the two cost attributes is equal to
the reference cost, while the other is either smaller (gain) or larger (loss), and the number
of gains and losses is balanced in the design. Costs were presented in DKK, rounded to
41 Euro (e) ≈ 7.5 DKK is used throughout.
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the nearest integer. The smallest cost attribute value allowed is 5 DKK (values lower than
this are truncated) and the smallest cost difference (between two alternatives) allowed is 1
DKK, to ensure values and comparisons are meaningful.
Each choice has four distinct travel time attributes (a low and a high for each alternative)
– one of these is equal to the reference value and the remaining three are computed based
on fixed ratios between the travel time attributes, which are taken from a list with six
predefined levels. Again, these levels are balanced in the design, as is the position of the
reference value. This ensures a very wide range of travel times in our analysis, as the same
respondent may experience choices where all time attributes are greater than or equal
to his reference travel time, as well as choices where all time attributes are smaller than
or equal to his reference travel time. In each alternative, the probability p can take the
values 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 0.9, to allow for as much variation as possible in the relation
between mean travel time and variance (note that much of this variation is achieved
through variations in the difference between the low and high travel time attribute).
For the sake of the statistical analysis, we have deliberately sought to ensure a wide
range of attribute levels, rather than limiting analysis to ‘realistic’ ones. The ratio between
the smallest and the largest of the four time attributes can be up to 2, such that the
maximum travel time attribute can be as large as twice the size of the reference travel
time, while the minimum travel time attribute can be as small as half the size of the
reference travel time. The departure time attribute varies in both directions by up to 1.5
times the reference travel time, and the cost attribute by up to 500 DKK times the sum
of the absolute deviations of the means and standard deviations of the two alternatives.
In both SP games, we used an orthogonal and partly randomised design rather than
an ’optimised design’. This is due to robustness considerations since the optimised design
requires the true scheduling model to be known in advance. The effects of assuming a
wrong ’true’ model are not sufficiently clear.
Finally, the questionnaire contained questions about the socio-economic background of
the respondents as well as questions related to their transportation habits/possibilities,
such as number of cars in the household, the nature of the parking facilities at their
workplace, and whether they own a bicycle or possess a public transport travel card.
12
3.2 Sample statistics and description
A total of 1335 respondents participated in the survey. To obtain a balanced sample and
ensure that the reference trip was salient in memory when respondents answer survey
questions, we omitted from our analysis 116 individuals who did not answer all 12 SP
choices or had an interview duration of more than 24 hours. It was possible to leave the
survey Internet page temporarily and come back later to complete it, and we registered
when respondents began the survey and when they last touched it. We do not require that
respondents completed the survey (by answering all questions and clicking ‘submit’), as
the last questions concern income and the respondents’ home and work addresses, which
some may not want to answer.
Even though the survey targeted morning commute trips, a few students and pensioners
with part-time jobs also answered the questionnaire. This was not intended, and since
they were quite few (80 individuals), we chose to discard these interviews and focus on
respondents whose primary occupation was as a wage earner or self-employed.
The remaining sample consists of 1139 respondents, each with 12 SP choices. For
robustness reasons, we decided to also omit the following respondents in the analysis:
• Nine respondents who reported that they made three or more stops between home
and work on their reference journey. We suspect that these people may interpret TTV
differently than people with few or no stops, because a large part of the variation
in travel time could be interpreted as due to the many stops along the way, and
respondents with many stops may think they have the possibility to avoid some of
the variability simply by rescheduling to move some of their errands to another (less
congested) time of day.
• 80 individuals with reference travel time above 100 minutes or reference cost above
200 DKK: Due to the SP design, these respondents will experience rather large time
and cost attribute values, and despite there are only a few respondents with such
extreme values, they might have a substantial effect on the results, particular in
the reduced form models where the travel time variance can become very large and
cause numerical problems in the likelihood optimisation algorithm.
Eventually, estimation is based on 1050 respondents representing 78.65% of the total
survey participants. Individuals who are used to congestion represent 45.7% of the
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Table 1: Share of respondents by categorical variables and sub-sample
Subsample S1 Subsample S2
(used to congestion) (not used to congestion)
Share of the total sample population
Male respondents 0.50 0.47
Respondents with a partner 0.91 0.91
Respondents with constraint at destination 0.55 0.57
Children < 10 years in the household 0.26 0.25
Respondents with constraint at origin 0.22 0.15
Respondents with less than high school education 0.02 0.02
High school or vocational school graduates 0.08 0.08
Those who completed higher education 0.51 0.44
Respondents with fixed working hours, same everyday 0.28 0.25
Respondents with fixed working hours, which can
vary from day to day
0.15 0.17
Respondents with flexible working time with some
fixed hours
0.35 0.34
Respondents with fully flexible working hours 0.18 0.18
Respondents with no stops on the commute 0.82 0.80
Respondents with 1 stops on the commute 0.15 0.17
Respondents with 2 stops on the commute 0.03 0.03
estimation sample. Table 1 and Table 2 present descriptive statistics of attributes and
background variables for the estimation sample. The two sub-samples are largely similar
in terms of various observed characteristics. However, the sub-samples are, to some extent,
dissimilar on the basis of achievement in higher education, whether there are constraints
regarding how early one can depart, annual respondent and household income and commute
length and costs.
Table 2: Sample statistics for continuous variables by subsample
Subsample S1 Subsample S2
(used to congestion) (not used to congestion)
1st quart. Mean 3rd quart. 1st quart. Mean 3rd quart.
Reference travel time (min) 24.8 37.1 45.0 15.0 27.2 35.0
Normal travel time (min) 25 37 45 15 27.97 35
Reference travel cost (e) 1.97 4.7 6.3 1.9 4.08 4.9
Reference departure time‡ 420 447.8 475 425 450.8 465
Normal departure time‡ 420 443.5 470 420 447.9 465
Working hours per week 37 37.7 40 37 37.1 40
Weekly commute days 5 4.6 5 5 4.6 5
Household size 2 2.7 4 2 2.6 3
Respondent age (years) 41 49.4 58 41 50.5 59
Annual household income† 46.7 86.8 73.5 44.8 61.1 66.7
Annual respondent income† 73.3 132.9 128 66.7 100.9 120
‡ Departure times are in minutes since midnight
† Income is in e 1000; mean values could be unreliable as no data cleaning is made for this variable.
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4 Empirical framework
We carry out two separate analyses using the scheduling and reduced form models.
Parameters of the scheduling models are estimated on data from choices where departure
times are given as attributes and hence are not optimally chosen, while the same parameters
under the reduced form models are estimated on data from choices where departure times
are not given as attributes – instead they are assumed to be chosen optimally by travellers.
We note that under this assumption of optimal departure times, the two approaches should
in theory yield the same result.
To estimate the parameters in the scheduling and reduced form models we use logit
models with the expected utilities in (3), (5) or (8) as ‘choice utility’. In an initial
modelling stage, we compared logit models with additive error terms to logit models with
multiplicative error terms (Fosgerau & Bierlaire, 2009). Models with multiplicative errors
yield much better fit. As a result, all subsequent models are estimated with multiplicative
error terms. Estimation is carried out in Biogeme (Bierlaire, 2003, 2009).
Since Börjesson et al. (2012) used additive error terms, they formulate the discrete
choice model in terms of differences in expected utility compared to a given reference. The
way we introduce error terms means that it matters to our analysis how we normalise
utility functions in our discrete choice model. In contrast to Börjesson et al. (2012), we
formulate the discrete choice model in terms of a total expected cost measured in monetary
units.
4.1 Estimation using the full scheduling model
To estimate preference parameters in the full scheduling model, we use a logit model with
the expected utility in (3) as ‘choice utility’, allowing for different parameters in the two
subsamples. With a multiplicative-errors specification, the choice utility of alternative j
with attributes dj, cj and Tj, for a respondent in subsample Sk is
Uj = − log
[
cj +
γSk1 − βSk1
2 (dj − t0)
2 + (γSk0 + γSk1 (dj − t0))ETj +
γSk1
2 ET
2
j
]
+ Ôj
µSk
, (11)
where the random errors Ôj are iid Gumbel distributed with scale parameter 1, and µSk
are error scale parameters to be estimated. In this and all other models, we normalized
the cost coefficient to one so that the values of travel time and reliability are estimated in
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willingness-to-pay space (Train & Weeks, 2005).
Note that (11) depends on t0, which has to be inferred or approximated from the
data. There are many different options regarding how to infer t0. One option is to use
information about travel time Tff and departure time dff under free flow (uncongested)
travel conditions. We assume that free flow departure time is chosen optimally given the
model in (3) and given a fixed travel time of Tff (no travel time variability). This implies
that (with separate coefficients for the two subsamples):
t0 = dff +
γSk1
γSk1 − βSk1
Tff (12)
For future reference, we label this model SM1 (scheduling model 1). We also estimate the
parameters in the special case, where βSk1 = 0, for both subsamples:
Uj = − log
[
cj +
γSk1
2 (dj − t0)
2 + (γSk0 + γSk1 (dj − t0))ETj +
γSk1
2 ET
2
j
]
+ Ôj
µSk
(13)
We label this SM2 (scheduling model 2).
The definition of t0 in (12) may be a rather strict assumption. In the discussion of our
results (Section 5) we argue that it is interesting to relax the assumption in (12) and see if
this affects the comparison of scheduling and reduced form models. To do so, we follow
Tseng & Verhoef (2008) and define t0 as a weighted average of departure time (dff ) and
preferred arrival time (PAT) under free flow(uncongested) travel conditions:
t0 = ωSkdff + (1− ωSk)PAT, (14)
where ωSk ∈ (0, 1) are sample-specific weights. We choose ωSk by estimating the scheduling
models SM1 and SM2 with (12) replaced by (14) for a range of different values of the
weights and choosing the values yielding the highest log-likelihood value. We label the
resulting models SM1’ and SM2’.
4.2 Estimation using reduced form models
To estimate preference parameters from the reduced form models, we use a discrete choice
model with either (5) or (8) as choice utility. As mentioned above, we consider two versions
of the reduced form model: One corresponding to (5), where β1 is a free parameter, and
another corresponding to (8), where β1 is fixed to zero. We refer to these as RFM1 and
RFM2 (reduced form model 1 and 2), respectively.
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With multiplicative errors, the RFM1 becomes:
Uj = − log
[
cj + θSk0 E(Tj) + θSk1 (E(Tj))2 + θSk2 σ2j
]
+ Ôj
µSk
(15)
Again, the random errors Ôj are iid Gumbel distributed with scale parameter 1, and
µSk are error scale parameters to be estimated. Now, if the scheduling model is true
and respondents truly consider the optimal departure times for the given travel time
distributions when choosing between alternatives (an underlying premise of the reduced
form model) and respondents reveal the same preferences in both choice games, we would
expect the following correspondences:
θSk0 = γSk0 (16)
θSk1 = −
βSk1 γ
Sk
1
2(γSk1 − βSk1 )
(17)
θSk2 =
γSk1
2 (18)
The RFM2 is the special case where βSk1 = 0, i.e. θ1 = 0 for both Sk:
Uj = − log
[
cj + θSk0 E(Tj) + θSk2 σ2j
]
+ Ôj
µSk
(19)
5 Results and discussion
5.1 Results from SM1, SM2, RFM1 and RFM2
Parameter estimates from the scheduling models in (11) and (13) are presented in Table 3
while estimates from the reduced form models (15) and (19) are shown in Table 4 . All
parameters have the expected sign and are significant, except γS11 in SM1 and both θ0’s in
RFM1, which are positive, but not significantly different from zero. Both models reveal
considerable differences between the two subsamples: People who are used to congestion
have higher γ0 and θ0 and lower γ1 and θ2 (hence lower value of reliability) than people
who are not used to congestion.
Based on both the SM1 and RFM1 models, we tested if there is structural difference
in preferences based on experience to congestion. We did this by estimating a restricted
model based on a pooled sample and separate models for each sub-sample, which together
represent the unrestricted model. Based on the likelihood ratio test, the hypothesis
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Table 3: Estimates from SM1 and SM2 with robust standard errors and z-values.
SM1 SM2
Parameter Estimate Std Err z-value Estimate Std Err z-value
Subsample S1 (used to congestion)
βS11 -0.006 0.002 -2.85∗∗∗
γS10 1.746 0.157 11.12∗∗∗ 1.737 0.142 12.251∗∗∗
γS11 0.002 0.002 1.00 0.007 0.001 4.558∗∗∗
µS1 3.233 0.264 12.23∗∗∗ 3.200 0.257 12.434∗∗∗
Subsample S2 (not used to congestion)
βS21 -0.008 0.002 -3.70∗∗∗
γS20 1.225 0.115 10.67∗∗∗ 1.270 0.110 11.563∗∗∗
γS21 0.005 0.002 2.92∗∗∗ 0.011 0.002 5.566∗∗∗
µ2 2.871 0.237 12.10∗∗∗ 2.873 0.232 12.364∗∗∗
Number of est. param. 8 6
Number of obs. 6300 6300
Log Likelihood value -4018.43 -4027.9
*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
that preferences are similar between the two sub-samples is rejected (p-value 2% for the
scheduling models and lower for the reduced form model). Consequently, in what follows,
we present results separately for the two subsamples.
Based on log-likelihood tests, we conclude that the reduction from SM1 to SM2 (i.e.
the test that β1 is zero) is strongly rejected (p-value around 0.01%). A similar test for the
reduction from RFM1 to RFM2 is also strongly rejected (p-value much smaller). Note that
the assumption embodied in SM2 and RFM2 implies constant marginal utility for staying
at the origin, instead of travelling, regardless of the time of day. Our results provide
evidence against this, which is in line with previous research by Tseng & Verhoef (2008).
Table 5 shows the values of travel time and reliability computed based on the estimated
parameters. Examining the difference between the two subsamples shows that, on average,
individuals that are used to congestion (S1) have higher VTT and lower VTTV than
respondents who are not used to congestion (S2). This result is consistent across models.
The observed difference in the valuation of TTV (travel time) between the two subsamples
can also be driven by self-selection or observable differences in characteristics. Since
exposure to congestion is not random, those with strong preference against congestion
may choose to work and reside in areas wherein they would minimize exposure to travel
time variability. Moreover, though the two subsamples are largely comparable in terms
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of observed characteristics (see Table 2), differences in income and other covariates may
also explain the observed dissimilarity in the valuation of TTV and travel time. However,
since this is outside the scope of the paper, we refrain from further discussion on the issue
and instead continue to describe the observed pattern.
Table 4: Parameter estimates of RFM1 and RFM2 with robust standard errors and z-values.
RFM1 RFM2
Parameter Estimate Std Err z-value Estimate Std Err z-value
Subsample S1 (used to congestion)
θS10 0.095 0.276 0.343 2.083 0.136 15.29∗∗∗
θS11 · 10 0.275 0.048 5.767∗∗∗
θS12 · 10 0.472 0.128 3.680∗∗∗ 0.412 0.110 3.76∗∗∗
µS1 2.963 0.313 9.461∗∗∗ 4.222 0.289 14.62∗∗∗
Subsample S2 (not used to congestion)
θS20 0.034 0.166 0.205 1.338 0.109 12.31∗∗∗
θS21 · 10 0.247 0.036 6.834∗∗∗
θS22 · 10 0.842 0.154 5.462∗∗∗ 0.805 0.143 5.64∗∗∗
µS2 2.662 0.242 10.988∗∗∗ 3.344 0.264 12.69∗∗∗
Number of est. param. 8 6
Number of obs. 6300 6300
Log Likelihood value -3973.27 -4031.77
*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
Another important discrepancy is the large difference in VTTV between the scheduling
models and the reduced form models. The magnitude of the difference is huge and similar
to that found by Börjesson et al. (2012). While they cannot rule out that the discrepancy
is caused by estimating the scheduling models on data without TTV, our results confirm
that a discrepancy exists even when both types of models are estimated on data with
uncertain travel times.
We can think of at least four possible explanations for the discrepancy. First, it may be
that respondents do not behave similarly in the two choice games. It is possible, e.g., that
the inclusion of the departure time attribute moves the focus of the respondents from TTV
to departure times. This would be a problem if the change of focus causes respondents to
neglect TTV in a degree that does not correspond to their real-life preferences. This is
the ‘focus bias explanation’ suggested by Börjesson et al. (2012). It is a classic example of
the drawbacks of using SP data, and it is of course not possible to check this explanation
using SP data alone.
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Table 5: Estimated values of travel time and TTV
Subsample S1 Subsample S2
(used to congestion) (not used to congestion)
SM1 RFM1 SM1 RFM1
Value of travel time variability 0.0001 0.0063 0.0003 0.0112
Value of travel time
E(T)=10 0.23 0.09 0.17 0.07
E(T)=20 0.24 0.16 0.17 0.14
E(T)=30 0.24 0.23 0.18 0.20
E(T)=60 0.24 0.45 0.19 0.40
E(T)=90 0.25 0.67 0.20 0.60
SM2 RFM2 SM2 RFM2
Value of travel time variability 0.0005 0.0055 0.0007 0.0107
Value of travel time 0.23 0.28 0.17 0.18
Value of travel time variability in e/min2; and value of travel time in e/min
A second line of explanation concerns the appropriateness of the theory in section 2.
Clearly, if the underlying assumptions in the scheduling model are incorrect, then the
derived equivalence between scheduling models and reduced form models does not hold.
However, even though the theoretical model is probably too simple to capture all facets of
real-life departure time choices, we have confidence that it captures some of the main effects,
and it may still serve as a useful approximation. An obvious source of misspecification
would be that the simple linear forms of the marginal utility functions H and W is
unrealistic for departure times far from t0. Misspecification also arises if individuals had
considered rescheduling possibilities, as this contradicts the assumption of exogenous
scheduling preferences in the model. Another potential misspecification, also mentioned
by Börjesson et al. (2012), is that the scheduling model does not allow for a disutility
of uncertainty per se: The only thing that matters is when the respondent departs and
arrives, so uncertainty enters solely through the expectation of the utility of arriving at
a specific time. In reality, it may be that TTV affects the individual’s perception of the
travel time or the travel situation as such, and thus affects the measured preferences in
other ways than through the expectation of the utility of arriving at a specific time. If this
effect is captured by θ2 in RFM1 and RFM2, but not to a similar degree by γ1 in SM1 and
SM2, it would cause a discrepancy between the model types consistent with what we find.
Even if the theoretical scheduling model is correct, the assumption of optimal departure
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time choice which is necessary for the equivalence between scheduling and reduced form
models, may be unrealistic in the context of SP data. Exact equivalence demands that
respondents, for each alternative in the choice set, visualise what would be the best
departure time given the travel time distribution and what would be the consequences of
this optimal departure time in terms of the different possible arrival times. This is almost
certainly unrealistic! However, the reduced form model may still be a good approximation
of real-life behaviour where travellers can adjust their departure time on their daily
commute until they reach an optimal solution. As such, we might have expected it to
also be an acceptable approximation in the analysis of SP choices, at least for experienced
travellers who are used to considering the effect of their departure time choice, and may
have developed some intuition or rule of thumb regarding the best departure time choice
for their daily commute. The magnitude of the discrepancy between our scheduling and
reduced form models however seems to reject this.
Finally, even if scheduling and reduced form models are indeed equivalent, the estimated
preferences in SM1 and SM2 are likely to depend somewhat on how we derive t0. If the
assumptions in (12) are far from reality, this causes an empirical misspecification that
renders the results of our scheduling models unreliable. This issue has so far been
investigated very little. In order to compare the scheduling and reduced form models one
can argue that our derivation of t0 in (12) is at least consistent between the two model
types, as it rests on an assumption of optimal departure time choice, which is the same
assumption that yields the reduced form models. However, we think it is relevant (and
fairly easy) to relax the strict assumptions in (12) and check how this affects our results.
We do this in the next section.
5.2 Results from SM1’ and SM2’
We estimated models SM1’ and SM2’ as described in Section 4. Various weights (ω) that
locate t0 at different points between dff and PAT were probed, and the implied values of
mean travel time and TTV are shown in Figure 2.5 In both models, parameter estimates
and the VTTV are, to some extent, sensitive to the location of t0. In particular, the closer
t0 is to PAT the higher the implied VTTV. This is so as the VTTV is entirely determined
by the slope of W (t), which becomes flatter as t0 gets closer to PAT. However, the value
5We probed weights (0.1,0.2,0.3,...,0.9) with all possible combinations for the two subsamples.
21
of travel time is largely unaffected by a change in the location of t0.
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Figure 2: The values of travel time and TTV by location of t0
For the full scheduling model, SM1’, we found ωS1 = 0.6 (for people used to congestion)
and with ωS2 = 0.4 (for those that are not used to congestion) yield the best model fit, in
terms of the log-likelihood value. For the case where β1 ≡ 0, the SM2’ model, ωS1 = 0.9
and ωS2 = 0.1 provided the best model fit. The parameter estimates for these models are
shown in Table 6. The implied value of mean travel time under SM1’ (SM2’) is similar to
that under SM1 (SM2); however, the values of TTV inferred from these models exhibit
certain dissimilarities.
In general however the values of travel time and TTV derived under the scheduling
model, regardless of how the location of t0 is determined, are considerably lower than the
corresponding value from the reduced form model. Hence, the way in which the location
of t0 is determined does not seem to explain the observed discrepancy in the values of
travel time and TTV between the scheduling and reduced form models. Moreover, SM1’
is preferred to SM2’ based on the Bayesian information criterion. Therefore, the choice
between SM1/SM1’ and SM2/SM2’ is not linked to how t0 is determined.
5.3 The value of standard deviation and reliability ratio
Thus far, the value of travel time variability measures the monetary value for a unit
improvement in travel time variance. However, the unit of variance is not easy to interpret
and this hinders comparison of the values of travel time variability between the current
paper against those in most previous research. We therefore compute another measure of
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Table 6: Estimates from SM1’ and SM2’, for best fitting values of ω
SM1’ SM2’
Estimate Std Err z-value Estimate Std Err z-value
Subsample S1 (used to congestion)
βS11 -0.005 0.001 -3.71∗∗∗
γS10 1.714 0.148 11.59∗∗∗ 1.690 0.141 11.99∗∗∗
γS11 0.003 0.001 2.59∗∗ 0.004 0.001 4.20∗∗∗
µS1 3.212 0.265 12.14∗∗∗ 3.147 0.248 12.69∗∗∗
ωS1 0.6 0.9
Subsample S2 (not used to congestion)
βS21 -0.007 0.002 -4.53∗∗∗
γS20 1.243 0.116 10.74∗∗∗ 1.250 0.110 11.40∗∗∗
γS21 0.006 0.002 3.39∗∗∗ 0.010 0.002 5.45∗∗∗
µS2 2.895 0.238 12.15∗∗∗ 2.851 0.232 12.31∗∗∗
ωS2 0.4 0.1
Number of est. param. 8 6
Number of obs. 6300 6300
Log Likelihood value -4017.691 -4037.513
∗∗∗ denotes signficance at the 1%, ∗∗ at the 5% level and ∗ at the 10% level
the value of travel time variability:
VSD = ∂EU
Sk
∂σT
=
 γ
Sk
1 σT for SM1
2θSk2 σT for RFM1,
(20)
to facilitate interpretation. This measure of travel time variability can be dubbed the
value of standard deviation (VSD), and it represents the monetary value of reducing
the standard deviation of travel time by one minute. As a result, the value of TTV is
expressed in the same unit as the value of travel time. Hence, one can examine the relative
importance of these quantities by taking the ratio of the marginal value of a minute’s
standard deviation and the marginal value of a minute’s travel time. This quantity is
known as the reliability ratio (RR).
Figure 3 portrays the VSD computed based on estimates from the full scheduling model
(SM1 in table 3) and its reduced form model (RFM1 in table 4) for a range of values of the
standard deviation of travel times (σT ). Examining the VSD under the two models shows
that, for a given σT , the value implied by the reduced form model is more than an order
of magnitude larger. In contrast, for a given µT , the value of time implied by one of these
models is less than 4 times the value suggested by the other. In both models, however,
the value of standard deviation increases with σT . Moreover, the difference between the
two subsamples in terms of the values of standard deviation is also apparent.
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Figure 3: The values of standard deviation of travel time under SM1 and RFM1
We also computed the reliability ratio for different combinations of mean and standard
deviation of travel time based on estimates from the full scheduling model (SM1) and its
reduced form model (RFM1). The result of our computation for a subsample of individuals
who are used to congestion is shown in Figure 4. For a given combination of (µT , σT ), the
reliability ratio implied by the reduced form model is more than an order of magnitude
greater than the corresponding value suggested by the scheduling model. This disparity is
largely produced by the difference in the value of reliability implied by the two models.
For a range of values of mean and standard deviation of travel time within the
sample, the reliability ratio implied by the scheduling model is less than values reported
in literature (see Carrion & Levinson (2012) and Kouwenhoven et al. (2014) for a recent
review). However, the reliability ratio implied by the reduced form model is, for most
combinations of the mean and standard deviation of travel time, comparable to values
reported in the literature.
In the scheduling model, since the value of travel time depends only marginally on the
level of µT (see Table 5), the reliability ratio barely varies in the dimension of µT . In the
reduced form model, however, the reliability ratio varies in both dimensions as the values
of travel time and VSD under this model depend, to a greater extent, on the level of mean
and standard deviation of travel time.
While the scheduling model is preferred on theoretical grounds, applied to our data,
it however produced a value of reliability that is not within a range of values one might
expect. In contrast, the implied value of reliability under the reduced form model is, by
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Figure 4: Reliability ratio by model for people used to congestion
and large, within a range of values reported in previous quantitative research. In this
context, the reduced form model seemed to produce reasonable values of reliability while
the scheduling model suggest values that are not in line with our expectation.
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6 Conclusions
Using data from a stated preference survey, we compare the slope model of the scheduling
approach and the implied reduced form model for measuring the value of travel time
variability. Our work is one of few applications of the slope model to investigate the
attitudes of car drivers towards travel time variability. Compared to previous studies (e.g.
Börjesson et al., 2012), we tested the implication of some model assumptions and used
data better suited for comparing the two models.
The finding of the paper is that, despite the better data foundation, we are not able
to empirically support the theoretical equivalence between these models. We find largely
comparable average value-of-time estimates between the two models, which are consistent
with values from other studies. However, the implied valuation of travel time variability for
these models are very different. This finding, which is robust to alternative specification of
the ‘ideal arrival’ time, is in line with the recent Swedish study by Börjesson et al. (2012).
However, due to data better suited for comparing the two models we are in a position to
rule out some of the potential explanations that were lined up for the observed discrepancy
between the scheduling and reduced form models.
We provide the following potential explanations as to why the two models are different:
First, it is possible that respondents in the stated choice experiment do not behave
according to the theory. Since the model does not address rescheduling possibilities, it
will be misspecified if respondents engage in rescheduling rather than acting according to
the given schedule. It is also possible that the assumed linearity of the marginal utility
function is causing a misspecification. Second, the complexity of the choice task may
influence respondents to take decisions in ways that deviate from utility maximization.
Rather than considering all attributes, respondents may have neglected some attributes
or focused on a subset of these to simplify their decision-making. The small parameter
estimate for travel time variability under the scheduling model could be linked to this
phenomenon. This is a focus bias explanation as discussed by Börjesson et al. (2012).
Moreover, under the scheduling model, scheduling considerations alone may not sufficiently
capture the valuation of travel time variability. There could be disutility associated with
the uncertainty per se, which is not accounted for in the model.
The similarity of the results in Börjesson et al. (2012) and our results suggest that
there may well be a more fundamental problem of estimating the valuation of travel time
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variability based on data from hypothetical experiments. Brownstone & Small (2005) were
able to estimate the value of travel time variability based on data from real behaviour. It
is therefore recommended that before we can rule out potential hypothetical bias, models
should be estimated based on data from real behaviour.
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Appendix
Table 7: List of notations
Notation Description
d, d∗ Departure time, optimal departure time
T Travel time
c Monetary cost of a trip
U,U∗ Scheduling utility, optimal scheduling utility
H(·),W (·) Marginal utility rates at origin and destination
β0, β1 Intercept and slope of utility rate at origin
γ0, γ1 Intercept and slope of utility rate at work
µT , σ2T Mean and variance of travel time
E Expected value operator
Tff Travel time under free flow (uncongested) condition
dff , PAT Departure time and preferred arrival time under free flow
θ0, θ1, θ2 Preference parameters under the reduced form models
t0 Desired arrival time when travel time is zero
ω A number in (0, 1) such that t0 = ωdff + (1− ω)PAT
Ô Gumbel distributed random error term
µ Error scale parameter
iid independent and identically distributed
30
Which journey do you prefer?
You choose your own departure time. Your preferred departure time may differ between A and B.
Journey A Journey B
Travel time 9 out of 10 times the 
journey takes 11 minutes
8 out of 10 times the 
journey takes 10 minutes
1 out of 10 times the 
journey takes 20 minutes
2 out of 10 times the 
journey takes 16 minutes
Cost 20 DKK 21 DKK
Your choice? O O
Choice situation 1 out of 12
Figure 5: Example of choice screen (translated from Danish)– choice without departure
time attribute
Which journey do you prefer?
Each journey has a fixed departure time.
Journey A Journey B
Departure time 8:00 AM 7:40 AM
Travel time 6 out of 10 times the 
journey takes 17 minutes
2 out of 10 times the 
journey takes 12 minutes
4 out of 10 times the 
journey takes 25 minutes
8 out of 10 times the 
journey takes 20 minutes
Cost 21 DKK 39 DKK
Your choice? O O
Choice situation 7 out of 12
Figure 6: Example of choice screen (translated from Danish) – choice with departure time
attribute
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Abstract
This paper examines the choice of an optimal meeting time in a situation where
individuals can freely choose meeting times. It extends the model of Fosgerau,
Engelson and Franklin (Journal of Urban Economics) to incorporate the notion of
an agreed meeting time and a penalty that may be imposed when one arrives later
than the meeting time. The model considers two individuals who choose departure
and meeting times in the presence of uncertain travel times for a trip towards a joint
meeting. The paper shows the existence of a unique optimal meeting time and a
unique Nash equilibrium in departure times. It finds that an increase in the variance
of the difference between individual travel times is costly for both individuals. It
also finds that an increase in travel time variance of one person is costly to both.
Compared to Fosgerau, Engelson and Franklin, the introduction of a lateness penalty
allows an additional mechanism through which a change in travel time variance of
one individual affects the pay-off of both individuals.
Keywords: travel time variability; value of reliability; endogenous scheduling of a meeting;
scheduling preferences
JEL code: R41
∗Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 2nd Symposium of the European Association
for Research in Transportation, Stockholm, 4-6 Sept, 2013; and at the ITEA’s Annual Conference and
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1 Introduction
The valuation of travel time variability (TTV) has received increasing attention over
the past few decades, both from researchers and policy makers. Starting from earlier
workers, inter alia by Small (1982) and Noland & Small (1995), there is a growing body of
research measuring the cost of TTV. Empirical evidence also shows that the economic
costs associated with TTV are significant (see Li et al. , 2010; Carrion & Levinson, 2012,
for recent review). As a result, the valuation of TTV is increasingly being recognised as
an important component in economic appraisal of transport projects.
The scheduling model (e.g. Vickrey, 1969; Small, 1982; Fosgerau & Karlstrom, 2010) is
the standard theoretical framework for measuring the cost of TTV. This model associates
the aversion to TTV with the cost of arriving earlier or later than desired. It considers
travellers who, facing a fixed arrival time and TTV, choose departure times to maximise
expected utility, from which the cost of TTV is derived. However, the assumption of
exogenously determined arrival time lacks generality which, even in situations such as
a meeting where arrival times may not be pre-determined, excludes the possibility that
the desired arrival time could depend on the distribution of travel times. Moreover, the
framework takes scheduling choices merely as an individual matter. In contrast, scheduling
choices can be widely seen as optimal reactions in contexts involving social interaction
(Basu & Weibull, 2003; Fosgerau & Small, 2010). In many cases, such as a meeting,
activities performed at the other end of a trip involve more than one person. In such
circumstances, one’s choices and travel outcomes can also affect all others involved.
Recently, Fosgerau et al. (2014) addressed these issues by building a model wherein
scheduling preferences are interdependent. The model considers two individuals who,
facing a random travel time towards a joint in-person meeting, choose departure times
to maximise scheduling utility. It is assumed that individuals prefer to depart later and
arrive earlier. The authors showed the existence of unique equilibrium departure times
and derived the value of a marginal reduction in the scale of TTV. In particular, they
found that an increase in the variance of the difference in individual travel times is costly
to both individuals, an insight overlooked by the customary scheduling model.
In the Fosgerau et al. (2014) model, the strategic interaction is induced by the property
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that a meeting starts only when both individuals have arrived at the destination. The
model assumes that players choose an optimal time to start the meeting. In the current
paper, we explicitly examine the choice of an optimal meeting time and the implication of
allowing for this choice on the value of TTV. We achieved this by extending their model
to include the notion of an agreed time to start the meeting and a penalty that may
be imposed when one arrives later that this time. The penalty represents an emotional
cost (embarrassment) of arriving later than the designated meeting time. The extension
introduces an additional mechanism through which TTV can affect equilibrium scheduling
utility.
We examine the optimal meeting time as an agreement outcome in the course of
bargaining. As we consider homogeneous individuals, the bargaining solution coincides
with the choice of individually optimal meeting time. We show the existence and uniqueness
of equilibrium departure times and an optimal meeting time. We also find that, at
equilibrium, an increase in the variance of the difference in travel times is costly to both
individuals. Moreover, an increase in the variance of individual travel times is found to
be costly to both individuals. While our results about the cost of TTV are qualitatively
similar to those in Fosgerau et al. (2014), in their model, the effect of increased variance
in individual travel times occurs fully through the variance of the travel time difference.
Our model also allows the variance of individual travel times to have a direct effect on
equilibrium utility.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the game theoretic framework,
Section 3 and Section 4 analyse choice equilibrium departure times and optimal meeting
time. We provide a numerical example in Section 5. On the basis of optimality conditions,
Section 6 examines the cost of TTV while the last section concludes.
2 The model
Our model builds upon the framework by Fosgerau et al. (2014), who considered scheduling
choices of two individuals who take a trip of random duration towards a joint in-person
meeting. Suppose the meeting is started only when both individuals have arrived at
the meeting place. Assuming options other than departure time are separable and are
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optimally chosen, the choice under each individual’s control is departure time. Given other
things, departure times determine the possibility of arriving early or late; and the aversion
to these outcomes induces preferences over departure times.
Preferences can be represented by a utility function. Suppose utility is derived at a
time dependent rate (e.g. see Vickrey, 1973; Tseng & Verhoef, 2008; Fosgerau & Engelson,
2011). Let h be the utility rate at the origin before the trip and γ > 0 be the utility rate
at destination from the joint meeting. Since starting the meeting requires the presence
of both individuals and, given travel duration, time of arrival is determined by a chosen
departure time, either individual’s choice influences the outcome to both thereby inducing
strategic interaction in decision making.
Suppose the marginal utility of time at destination before the meeting and the marginal
utility of time spent travelling are equal and normalized to zero. Thus, h and γ are
expressed relative to the marginal utility of travel time. It is also assumed through out
that h is non-negative, continuously differentiable and strictly decreasing, i.e., h′ < 0.
In this setting, Fosgerau et al. (2014) denoted the scheduling utility to an individual i
who departs at time di and arrives at destination at time ai = di + Ti as
Ui (di, dj) =
∫ di
0
hi(x) dx− γi max(ai, aj) (1)
where Ti ≥ 0 is random travel time and max(ai, aj) is the time at which the meeting starts.
The time at which each person begins the activity at the origin as well as the time when
the meeting ends is normalized to zero without loss of generality.
We extended this formulation by introducing the notion of an agreed meeting time
m and a penalty that may be imposed when a person arrives later than this time. The
penalty represents an emotional cost, embarrassment, of arriving later than the appointed
meeting time. Letting η > 0 denote the marginal lateness penalty and assuming that
individuals are homogeneous, hence γi = γj = γ, we arrive at the following utility function
Ui(di, dj,m) =
∫ di
0
h(x) dx− γ
[
ai + aj
2 +
|di − dj −∆|
2
]
− ηmax(ai −m, 0), (2)
where max(ai − m, 0) is the duration of lateness when player i arrives later than m,
∆ ≡ Tj−Ti and max(ai, aj) = ai+aj2 + |di−dj−∆|2 . We assume that ∆ has a compact support
and a continuous cumulative distribution function Φ∆.
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The decision making process is both strategic and sequential as depicted in Figure 1.
Once individuals agreed to meet, they will set a time for their meeting. Then each
individual chooses an optimal departure time considering the agreed meeting time and the
departure time choice of the other person. The strategic interaction at this stage is induced
by the physical property that a meeting starts at the time when both individuals arrive at
the destination. Finally, actual outcomes are known when travel times are realized. The
choice of a meeting time influences the choice of a departure time; and the latter choice is
made conditioning on the chosen meeting time.
When
to meet?
When to 
depart?
When to 
depart?
YesMeeting?
Person 1
Person 2
Travel times 
Figure 1: Hierarchy of travel decision making
Travel times are not known with certainty before the trip. But we assume individuals
know the distribution of travel times and take this in to account when they make scheduling
choices. It is also assumed that each individual i chooses departure and meeting times in
a continuous fashion from a compact interval Di and M , respectively, each of which are
wide enough to encompass all relevant possibilities. We also assumed that an individual’s
choice of departure and meeting times does not influence the distribution of travel times.
Moreover, individual travel times, Ti, are assumed to have identical continuous cumulative
distribution function FTi that has a compact support and mean µi.
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3 Equilibrium departure times
Suppose agreement is reached to start the meeting at a particular time, m. Given m and
player j’s choice of departure time, each player i chooses his departure time to maximize
expected utility. Formally, optimal departure times can be expressed in terms of a best
response correspondence. Individual i’s best response correspondence ri(.) is the set of
optimal departure times for any given choice of departure time by the other person:
ri(dj) = {d∗i ∈ Di : ui (d∗i ; dj,m) ≥ ui (di; dj,m) , for all di ∈ Di}
where ui = E[Ui] and E is the expected value operator. Each best response satisfies
∂u1
∂d1
= h (d1)− γΦ∆ (d1 − d2)− η [1− FT1 (m− d1)] = 0
∂u2
∂d2
= h (d2) + γΦ∆ (d1 − d2)− η [1− FT2 (m− d2)] = γ
(3)
The derivation of (3) is shown in Appendix B. The condition implies that an individual’s
optimal departure time equates the marginal utility of time at destination before departure
and the marginal expected utility loss from delaying departure.
Since the pay-off to an individual player depends on the choice of both individuals,
an independent choice of departure time may not maximize individual utility. Nash
equilibrium is obtained when players choose departure times such that their choices are
mutually best responses to one another. The existence of this equilibrium is established
based on properties of best response mappings stated in the following lemma. The proof
of this lamma along with all other proofs is given in Appendix C.
Lemma 1 Each ri(dj) is a continuous function.
At Nash equililibrium, no individual has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from the
equilibrium profile. This is the case if each best response satisfies 0 ≤ h (di) ≤ γ + η since
otherwise deviation from equilibrium is gainful. A pair of feasible departure times
(
d∗i , d
∗
j
)
identifies a Nash equilibrium profile if for every individual i, ui
(
d∗i , d
∗
j
)
≥ ui
(
di, d
∗
j
)
for
every di ∈ Di. An equilibrium profile can be defined as a fixed point of players’ best
response functions: r(d) = ri(dj)×rj(di). At equilibrium, a departure time profile is chosen
such that (3) holds simultaneously for both individuals. Adding (3) across individuals and
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rearranging yields the joint requirement for Nash equilibrium:
2∑
i=1
[
h(di)− η (1− FTi (m− di))
]
= γ (4)
The requirement in (4) will be satisfied if the following condition holds:
Condition 1 lim
x→∞
[
h(x)
]
< η + γ2
Condition 1 guarantees general existence of Nash equilibrium and is maintained
throughout the paper. Unless this condition holds there will be an incentive to deviate
from the equilibrium profile.
Theorem 1 There is a unique Nash equilibrium in departure times.
While each person’s optimal departure time depends on the probability with which one
person arrives later than the other, Φ (.), the equilibrium profile (4) does not depend on
this term. The fact that r′i (dj) > 0 (see the proof of Theorem 1) indicates that departure
times are strategic complements suggesting that the choice of departure time by one person
elicits a similar response from the other. So that the two effects cancel out at equilibrium.
In other words, if person i departs late then j’s incentives to depart early are very small
as it will not help to start the meeting earlier.
We examined the equilibrium departure time profile conditional on a chosen meeting
time, hence d∗i = di(m) for both i. The maximum expected utility at this stage is found
by inserting the equilibrium profile (d∗i , d∗j) in (2), which yields
Vi(m) ≡
∫ di(m)
0
h (x) dx− γ2
[∑
i
di (m) +
∑
i
µTi +
∫
|di (m)− dj (m)− x|φ∆ (x) dx
]
− η
∫ +∞
m−di(m)
(
di (m) + x−m
)
fTi (x) dx (5)
A change in m affects utility through equilibrium departure times besides its direct effect
on the penalty of lateness. Vi (m) plays a an important role when examining the choice of
optimal start time for the meeting.
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4 Optimal meeting time
In the previous section, we assumed a chosen meeting time to examine equilibrium
behaviour in departure times. The meeting is not determined as part of Nash equilibrium
since, if either player is given control over it, he or she will take the other player’s choice
of departure time as given and choose to depart as late as possible. This, however, rules
out the possibility that players could cooperate to set a meeting time that could make
both of them better off. Such a meeting time can be obtained as an agreement outcome in
a process of negotiation.
The negotiation could start with one of the players selecting an easily agreeable time.
Players then try to find other agreeable points in M which are better for both. Eventually,
both players are required to agree upon what would be a desirable time for the meeting.
When heterogeneous, players can have conflicting interests as to what would be a
desirable meeting time. However, since players are homogeneous in our case, they have
perfectly compatible interests. As a result, an optimal choice of meeting time for one
player is also optimal for the other. We assume that the agreement outcome is Pareto
optimal, i.e., there is no other feasible meeting time that can make a player better off
without making the other player worse off. With Pareto optimal agreement outcomes,
the homogeneity of players reduces the bargaining problem to an individual maximisation
problem. The following condition ensures that the solution to the bargaining problem is
unique.
Condition 2 The density of travel times, fTi(.), is non-increasing at the optimally allowed
travel time, Ti = (m∗ − d∗i ), i.e., f ′Ti (m∗ − d∗) ≤ 0.
Some distributions such as the exponential and uniform have this condition as a general
feature while for others such as the normal distribution, the condition requires that the
optimally allowed travel time should lie at a point where the density function is downward
sloping. The following theorem states the existence and uniqueness of an optimal meeting
time.
Theorem 2 There exists an optimal meeting time m∗ satisfying the condition
η
[
1− FTi
(
m∗ − di(m∗)
)]
− γ
[
1− Φ∆
(
di(m∗)− dj(m∗)
)]
d′j(m∗) = 0. (6)
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The optimal meeting time m∗ is unique by Condition 2.
In what follows we derive the optimal meeting time and illustrate the nature of Vi(.)
with a numerical example.
5 Numerical example
This section illustrates the existence and uniqueness of an optimal meeting time using a
numerical example. Let h (di) = (1− di) for 0 ≤ di ≤ 1 so that h′ (di) = −1; and assume
individual travel times are independent and uniformly distributed, T = Ti ∼ U (0, 1), such
that the travel time difference ∆ has density
φ∆ (x) =
 x+ 1 if − 1 < x < 01− x if 0 ≤ x < 1,
which is a triangular distribution.
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Figure 2: Optimal expected utility as a function of m
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In this setting, the requirement for Nash equilibrium (4) becomes
2 (1− d)− 2η (1− FT (m− d)) = γ,
where d = di for both i is used noting the symmetry of equilibrium. Using FT (x) = x for
x ∈ [0, 1) and rearranging we obtain the equilibrium departure time d∗ = d (m) as
d (m) = 2 [1 + η (m− 1)]− γ2 (1 + η) for m ∈ [d, d+ 1)
Therefore d′(m) = η1+η ∈ (0, 1). By inserting the relevant expression in (6), we obtain the
optimal meeting time m∗ = 2− γ.
For the case where γ = η = 1, the optimal meeting time is m∗ = 1 and the equilibrium
departure times profile is (0.25, 0.25). The optimal expected utility, Vi(m), is concave
on a feasible interval of meeting times (see Figure 2). Since the slope of fT (.) is zero,
the condition for unique optimal meeting time is always satisfied. In fact, we have
V ′′i (m) = − η1+η < 0 indicating uniqueness of the optimal meeting time.
6 The value of travel time variability
Each person’s maximal expected utility is obtained by inserting the equilibrium departure
time profile and optimal meeting time in to the expected utility function. From this
maximal utility function, we then derive each person’s valuation of a reduction in the
variance of travel times and the variance of the travel time difference. This is achieved
by considering the effect on equilibrium utility of a marginal reduction in σi or σ. To
do this, we denote each Ti in a convenient form Ti = µi + σiXi where µi and σi are its
mean and standard deviation respectively; and Xi is a standardized random variable with
zero mean, unit variance, continuous density fXi and a cumulative distribution FXi with
a compact support. Likewise, we denote ∆ in a similar form ∆ = µ+ σX where X is a
standardised variable with zero mean and unit variance, a continuous density function φX
and a continuous and increasing cumulative distribution ΦX .
Since equilibrium choices are determined based on a given (σ, σi), a change in either
of these parameters induces individuals to adjust their optimal choices. However, since
choices are optimized in a continuous fashion, the change does not cause a second-order
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effect on utility through own choices (due to the envelope theorem). More precisely, for
each individual i, the indirect effect of the change occurs only through person j’s choice of
departure time.
Theorem 3 Starting from equilibrium, a small increase in the scale of travel time differ-
ence, σ, is costly to both individuals.
The result in Theorem 3 is qualitatively similar to that in Fosgerau et al. (2014),
which is expected since σ does not enter the added term in our model. However, although
σ does not enter the cost of arriving later than the designated meeting time, the effect to
each person i of a change in σ also occurs through a change in person j’s departure time.
Theorem 4 Suppose individual travel times, Xi, exhibit same degree of variability, i.e.,
σi = σj. Then, starting from equilibrium where individuals do not allow for TTV, i.e.,
m∗ − d∗i = µi, a small increase in σi is costly to both individuals.
An equilibrium where individuals do not allow for TTV, i.e., m∗ − d∗i = µi, may not
occur in the model, however, it is required to prove the assertion in Theorem 4.
Since the conventional scheduling model takes the case of a single traveller, a change
in the variance of travel times for one person is independent of the pay-offs to the other
player. Due to the strategic interaction in our model, however, such a change influences
scheduling choices and hence the equilibrium utility to the other person.
While the result in Theorem 4 is qualitatively similar to Fosgerau et al. (2014), it
differs in two respects. Firstly, in our model a change in the travel time variance of person i
directly affects own equilibrium utility beyond and above its effect through the variance of
the travel time difference. This is so since σi enters person i’s equilibrium utility through
the penalty of lateness. In contrast, in Fosgerau et al. (2014) the effect on utility of a
change in the travel time variance of person i occurs fully through the variance of the
travel time difference. Secondly, they find that the effect of an increase in the travel
time variance of person i depends on how travel times are correlated. However, since we
assume homogeneous players with σi = σj, an increase in σi makes random travel times
less synchronized (increases the variance of travel time difference). Therefore, it is costly
to both individuals.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we extended a model by Fosgerau et al. (2014) examining a meeting between
two individuals by introducing a notion of designated meeting time and a penalty that may
be imposed when one arrives later than this time. In this model, we showed that there
exists a unique equilibrium in departure times and a unique optimal meeting time. We
found that an increase in the variance of the difference between individual travel times is
costly for both individuals. It is also found that an increase in travel time variance of one
person is costly to both individuals. Compared to Fosgerau et al. (2014), the introduction
of a lateness penalty allows an additional mechanism through which a change in travel
time variance of one individual affects the pay-off of both individuals.
Results in our paper crucially depend on the homogeneity of players. In a future
work, the model can be extended to include non-homogeneous individuals. Moreover, our
model considered a meeting involving only two individuals. This can also be extended to
accommodate a situation involving more than two individuals.
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Appendix
A Notation
Table 1: List of notation
Notation Description
i, j Individuals, two
di Individual i’s departure time
Ti Individual i’s travel time
∆ Travel time difference, Tj − Ti
Xi Individual i’s standardised travel time
X Standardised travel time difference
ai Individual i’s arrival time: ai = di + Ti
m Designated meeting time
ri Individual i’s best response function
Ui Individual i’s utility function
ui Individual i’s expected utility
Vi ui at equilibrium departure times
Wi Vi at equilibrium departure times and optimal meeting time
γ Marginal utility of time spent in a joint meeting
η Marginal cost of arriving later than an agreed meeting time
h Marginal utility of spending time at the origin
µi Individual i’s mean travel time
µ Mean of the travel time difference
σ Standard deviation of the travel time difference
σi Standard deviation of travel time for individual i
d∗i ,m
∗ Shows the the variable is at equilibrium or optimum
fTi , fXi , φ∆, φX Probability density function of the relevant variable
FTi , FXi ,Φ∆,ΦX Cumulative probability density of the relevant variable
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B Derivation
Derivation of (3). We obtain the first order conditions for Nash equilibrium in (3) by
differentiating each person’s expected utility with respect to own departure time, holding
m and the other person’s choice of departure time constant. That is, for each i and j Ó= i,
the optimal choice departure time for person i satisfies
∂ui
∂di
= ∂
∂di
[∫ di
0
h (x) dx− γ2
(
di + dj + µi + µj +
∫
|di − dj − x|φ∆ (x) dx
)
− η
∫ ∞
m−di
(di + x−m) fTi (x) dx
]
= 0. (7)
Noting that
|di − dj − x| =
 di − dj − x for x ≤ di − dj− (di − dj − x) for x ≥ di − dj
and letting ϑ ≡ di − dj, we obtain1
∂
∂di
∫
|ϑ− x|φ∆ (x) dx = ∂
∂di
[∫ ϑ
−∞
(ϑ− x)φ∆ (x) dx−
∫ ∞
ϑ
(ϑ− x)φ∆ (x) dx
]
=
∫ ϑ
−∞
φ∆ (x) dx−
(∫ ∞
ϑ
φ∆ (x) dx
)
=
∫ ϑ
−∞
φ∆ (x) dx−
(
1−
∫ ϑ
−∞
φ∆ (x) dx
)
= 2Φ∆ (ϑ)− 1
Moreover, we have
∂
∂di
∫ ∞
m−di
(di + x−m) fTi (x) dx =
∫ ∞
m−di
fTi (x) dx = 1− FTi (m− di)
Substituting these expressions in (7), we obtain:
∂ui
∂di
= h(di)− γ2 (1 + 2Φ∆(ϑ)− 1)− η (1− FTi (m− di)) = 0
Therefore, the expression in (3) follows straightforwardly by rearranging this and replacing
ϑ by di − dj.
1We differentiate under the integral applying:
∂
∂x
(∫ b(x)
ü(x)
g(x, z) dz
)
= b′(x)g (b(x), x)− ü′(x)g (ü(x), x) +
∫ b(x)
ü(x)
∂g(x, z)
∂x
dz
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C Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Since ui (.; dj,m) is continuous and strictly concave and Di is
compact and convex, ri (.) is a single-valued correspondence, hence a function. Since each
best response function can be defined as an intersection set of two convex sets
ri(dj) = Di ∩ {d∗i : ui(d∗i ; dj,m) = max
di∈Di
ui(di; dj,m)}
with the latter being the upper contour set of the concave function ui, it follows that each
best response is also convex-valued. Moreover, since the constraint correspondence for
each person’s maximisation problem is compact-valued and fixed, hence continuous, each
ri(dj) is upper hemi-continuous by Berge’s maximum theorem.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof has two parts - existence and uniqueness. We first
provide the proof for existence based on a fixed point theorem.
Existence: Let D ≡ Di×Dj and d ≡ (di, dj), and define a correspondence r : D ⇒ D
by r (di, dj) = ri (dj) × rj (di). The requirement for Nash equilibrium amounts to the
existence of a profile d∗ such that d∗ ∈ r (d). This is essentially a fixed point of r (d).
Hence, a fixed point theorem can be used to show the existence of Nash equilibrium.
If D is convex and compact, and r (.) is non-empty, upper hemi-continuous, and
compact- and convex-valued, then r (d) has a fixed point by Kakutani’s fixed point
theorem. D inherits the required properties as each Di has these properties. Moreover,
since each ri is non-empty, upper hemi-continuous and compact- and convex-valued by
Lemma 1, it follows that r (.) is also non-empty, upper hemi-continuous, and compact- and
convex-valued. Since r (d) satisfies the requirements for Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, it
has at least one fixed point hence Nash equilibrium by definition.
Uniqueness: For an equilibrium profile d∗, when person i chooses d∗i and j responds
with rj (d∗i ), i has no incentive to unilaterally deviate from the equilibrium profile; hence
d∗i = ri (rj (d∗i )). Each response function, ri(.), is continuous by Berge’s maximum theorem.
If r′i(dj) < 1 for ∀dj ∈ Dj, at most one equilibrium can exist. The proof is suggested by
Fosgerau et al. (2014), and is shown to hold as follows.
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From (3) we have best response functions ri(dj) satisfying:
0 = h
(
ri(dj)
)
− γΦ∆
(
ri (dj)− dj
)
− η [1− FTi (m− ri(dj))]
Now differentiate and rearrange this expression to obtain
∂ri (dj)
∂di
=
−γφ∆
(
ri (dj)− dj
)
h′
(
ri (dj)
)
− γφ∆
(
ri (dj)− dj
)
− ηfTi
(
m− ri (dj)
) ,
which is positive and strictly less than one since h′(.) < 0 and probability density functions
are non-negative. Therefore, for both i and all (di, dj) ∈ D, ∂ri(rj(di))∂di =
∂ri(dj)
∂dj
∂rj(di)
∂di
< 1
ensuring the existence of at most one equilibrium profile.
Proof of Theorem 2. The existence of an optimal meeting time m∗ follows since each
Vi(.) is continuous on a closed and bounded intervalM such that there exists some m∗ ∈M
with Vi(m∗) ≥ Vi(m) for all m ∈M . Applying the Envelope theorem, the requirement for
an optimal meeting time can be given by
dVi(m)
dm =
∂Vi(m)
∂dj
∂dj(m)
∂m
+ ∂Vi(m)
∂m
= 0 (8)
where ∂Vi(m)
∂di
= 0 since Vi(d∗i ; dj,m) ≥ Vi(di; dj,m) for all di ∈ Di. Moreover, we have
∂Vi
∂m
= −η ∂
∂m
∫ ∞
m−di(m)
(
di(m) + x−m
)
fTi (x) dx = η
(
1− FTi (m− di(m))
)
≥ 0
and
∂Vi
∂dj
= −γ2 −
γ
2
∂
∂dj
[∫ ϑ
−∞
(
ϑ− y
)
φ∆ (y) dy −
∫ ∞
ϑ
(ϑ− y)φ∆ (y) dy
]
= −γ
[
1− Φ∆ (ϑ)
]
= −γ2 < 0
where ϑ ≡ di(m) − dj(m). The last expression is obtained by symmetry of equilibrium
which implies that ϑ = 0. Then, we derive ∂di
∂m
by differentiating the equilibrium condition:
0 = ∂
∂m
[∑
i
h (di(m))− γΦ∆ (ϑ) + η
∑
i
(
1− FTi (m− di(m))
)]
. (9)
Since the equilibrium is symmetric, i.e., d(m) = di(m) for both i, we will have Φ∆(ϑ) = 12 .
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Differentiating the resulting expression yields
h′
(
d(m)
)
d′(m)− η
(
1− fT (m− d(m))
)
= 0, (10)
which can be rearranged to obtain
d′(m) = −ηfT (m− d(m))
h′ (d(m))− ηfT (m− d(m)) (11)
Since fT (.) ≥ 0 and h′(.) < 0, we have d′(m) ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, the first order condition
for an optimal meeting time will be
η
[
1− FTi (m− di(m))
]
− γ
[
1− Φ∆ (ϑ)
]
d′2 (m) = 0, (12)
as given in Theorem 2.
Uniqueness: If each V ′′i (m) < 0, then the optimal meeting time is unique. To show
whether this is the case, differentiate (9) while noting the symmetry of equilibrium (hence
di(m) = d(m), FTi (x) = FT (x) and Φ∆ (0) = 12) which yields
V ′′ (m) = −γ2d
′′ (m)− η [1− d′ (m)] fT (m− d (m)) (13)
We want to show that (13) is less than zero at the point where m = m∗ and d = d (m∗),
which holds if
d′′ (m) = ∂
∂m
[
− ηfT (m− d (m))
h′ (d (m))− ηfT (m− d (m))
]
≥ 0
Differentiating and rearranging, one can state the inequality as
f ′T (m− d) ≤
h′′ (d (m)) d′ (m) fT (m− d (m))
(1− d′ (m))h′ (d (m)) ≤ 0,
which holds by Condition 2.
Proof of Theorem 3. Each person’s maximal expected utility is obtained by inserting
the optimal meeting time, m∗, in to Vi(m):
Wi ≡
di(m∗)∫
0
h(x) dx− γ2
[∑
i
(
di(m∗) + µi
)
+
∫
|di(m∗)− dj(m∗)− µ− σx|φX(x) dx
]
− η
∫ +∞
τi
(
di(m∗) + µi + σix−m∗
)
fXi(x) dx (14)
where τi = m−di(m
∗)−µi
σi
. To each individual i, the effect on equilibrium expected utility,
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Wi, of a marginal change in σ is
dWi
dσ =
∂Wi
∂dj
∂dj
∂σ
+ ∂Wi
∂σ
where
∂Wi
∂dj
= −γ2
[
1 + ∂
∂dj
∫
|di − dj − µ− σx|φX (x) dx
]
= −γ2
1 + ∂
∂dj
 τ∫
−∞
(di − dj − µ− σx)φX (x) dx−
∞∫
τ
(di − dj − µ− σx)φX (x) dx

= −γ2
[
1−
∫ τ
−∞
φX (x) dx+
∫ ∞
τ
φX (x) dx
]
= −γ
[∫ ∞
τ
φX (x) dx
]
≤ 0
where the inequality follows since E(X) = 0, and τ ≡ di−dj−µ
σ
is used to conserve space.
One can derive ∂dj
∂σ
by differentiating (3) and (4) as:
h′(di)
∂di
∂σ
− γ
σ
φX (τ)
(
∂di
∂σ
− ∂dj
∂σ
− τ
)
− η
σi
∂di
∂σ
fXi (τi) = 0
h′(di)
∂di
∂σ
+ h′ (dj)
∂dj
∂σ
− η
σi
∂di
∂σ
fXi (τi)−
η
σj
∂dj
∂σ
fXj (τj) = 0
Denoting ci ≡ h′(di)− ησifXi (τi) < 0 and collecting like terms, we obtain
∂di
∂σ
= −
γ
σ
φX(τ)
∂dj
∂σ
+ γ
σ
φX(τ)τ
(ci− γσ φX(τ))
= −cj
ci
∂dj
∂σ
Solving the last two terms for ∂dj
∂σ
yields
∂dj
∂σ
= γφX (τ) ci
σcicj − γφX (τ) (ci + cj)τ ≡ κτ
where −1 < κ ≤ 0. Also, noting that E(X) = 0,
∂Wi
∂σ
= −γ2
∂
∂σ
[∫ τ
−∞
(di − dj − µ− σx)φX (x) dx−
∫ +∞
τ
(di − dj − µ− σx)φX (x) dx
]
= −γ2
[
−
∫ τ
−∞
xφX (x) dx+
∫ +∞
τ
xφX (x) dx
]
= −γ2
[∫ ∞
τ
xφX (x) dx+
∫ +∞
τ
xφX (x) dx
]
= −γ
∫ ∞
τ
xφX (x) dx ≤ 0
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The inequality follows since E(X) = 0. Therefore,
dWi
dσ = −γ
[∫ ∞
τ
φX (x) dx
]
κτ − γ
∫ ∞
τ
xφX (x) dx
= −γ
[∫ ∞
τ
(x+ κτ)φX (x) dx
]
< 0
since
dWi
dσ
(
x, κ = 0
)
≤ dWidσ
(
x, κ
)
≤ dWidσ
(
x, κ = −1
)
< 0
Thus, an increase in the standard deviation of the difference in travel times is costly for
both individuals.
Proof of Theorem 4. This proof has two parts. First, we show that a small increase
in σi is costly to individual i, i.e.,
dWi
dσi
= ∂Wi
∂σ
∂σ
∂σi
+ ∂Wi
∂dj
∂dj
∂σi
+ ∂Wi
∂σi
≤ 0
where
∂Wi
∂σi
= −η ∂
∂σi
∫ ∞
τi
(di + µi + σix−m) fXi (x) dx = −η
∫ ∞
τi
xfXi (x) dx ≤ 0
For simplicity we suppress the ∗ superscripts. The following notations are also used to
economise space: λ ≡ γ/σ, ηi ≡ η/σi, ci ≡ h′ (di)− ηifXi (τi) < 0, si ≡ ci − λφX (τ) < 0
and ϕi ≡ ηifXi (τi) ≥ 0.
The derivative ∂dj
∂σi
can be derived from (3) and (4). Differentiating the second expres-
sions in (3), we have
0 = h′ (dj)
∂dj
∂σi
+
(
∂di
∂σi
− ∂dj
∂σi
− ∂σ
∂σj
τ
)
λφX (τ)− ηjfXj (τj)
∂dj
∂σi
0 = sj
∂dj
∂σi
+ λφX (τ)
∂di
∂σi
− λφX (τ) τ ∂σ
∂σj
therefore
∂di
∂σi
= τ ∂σ
∂σj
− sj
λφX (τ)
∂dj
∂σi
(15)
Also, differentiating the joint equilibrium condition in (4),
h′ (dj)
∂dj
∂σi
+ h′ (di)
∂di
∂σi
− ϕi ∂di
∂σi
− ηifXi (τi) τi − ηjfXj (τj)
∂dj
∂σi
= 0
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and rearranging it we obtain:
∂di
∂σi
= ϕiτi
ci
− cj
ci
∂dj
∂σi
(16)
Solving for ∂dj
∂σi
from (15) and (16) and rearranging we obtain
∂dj
∂σi
= λφX (τ)
λφX (τ) (cicj)− cicj
[
ϕiτi − ciτ ∂σ
∂σj
]
Starting from an equilibrium point where m− di = µi, then τi = 0 implying that
∂dj
∂σi
= − λφX (τ) ci
λφX (τ) (ci + cj)− cicj τ
∂σ
∂σj
≡ −ωτ ∂σ
∂σj
where 0 ≤ ω < 1 since ci < 0 and ∂σ∂σi ≥ 0. Therefore,
dWi
dσi
= ∂Wi
∂σ
∂σ
∂σi
+ ∂Wi
∂dj
∂dj
∂σi
+ ∂Wi
∂σi
=
[
−γ
∫ ∞
τ
xφX (x) dx
]
∂σ
∂σi
+ γ
[∫ ∞
τ
φX (x) dx
]
ωτ
∂σ
∂σj
− η
∫ ∞
τi
xfXi (x) dx
= −γ
∫ ∞
τ
(
∂σ
∂σi
x− ωτ ∂σ
∂σj
)
φX (x) dx− η
∫ ∞
τi
xfXi (x) dx
= −γ ∂σ
∂σi
∫ ∞
τ
(x− ωτ)φX (x) dx− η
∫ ∞
τi
xfXi (x) dx
The last expressions follows as σi = σj is assumed, which implies that
∂σ
∂σj
= ∂σ
∂σi
= 2 (σi − ρσj) = 2 (σi − ρσi) = 2σi (1− ρ) ≤ 0
where the inequality follows since the correlation coefficient ρ lies in the interval [−1, 1].
Since E(Xi) = 0 and E(X) = 0, we have:
dWi
dσi
(
x, ω = 0
)
≤ dWidσi
(
x, ω
)
≤ dWidσi
(
x, ω = 1
)
< 0
therefore, an increase in σi is costly for individuals i.
Now we prove the second assertion in Theorem 4 that a small increase in σj is costly
to individual i, i.e.,
dWi
dσj
= ∂Wi
∂σ
∂σ
∂σj
+ ∂Wi
∂dj
∂dj
∂σj
≤ 0
We already derived component of this expression except, ∂di
∂σi
, which can derived from (15)
and (16) as
ϕiτi
λφX (τ)
− τ ∂σ
∂σi
− si
λφX (τ)
∂di
∂σi
= ϕiτi
cj
− ci
cj
∂di
∂σi
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solving for ∂di
∂σi
and rearranging we obtain
∂di
∂σi
= λφX (τ)− cj
λφX (τ) ci − sicjϕiτi +
λφX (τ) cj
λφX (τ) (ci + cj)− cicj τ
∂σ
∂σi
hence for τi = 0, the expression reduces to
∂di
∂σi
= λφX (τ) cj
λφX (τ) (ci + cj)− cicj τ
∂σ
∂σi
≡ ζτ ∂σ
∂σi
where 0 ≤ ζ < 1. Combining the relevant expressions, we have:
dWi
dσj
= ∂Wi
∂σ
∂σ
∂σj
+ ∂Wi
∂dj
∂dj
∂σj
= −
[
γ
∫ ∞
τ
xφX (x) dx
]
∂σ
∂σj
−
[
γ
∫ ∞
τ
φX (x) dx
]
ζτ
∂σ
∂σi
= −γ ∂σ
∂σi
[∫ ∞
τ
(x+ ζτ)φX (x) dx
]
where the last expression following using ∂σ
∂σi
= ∂σ
∂σj
. Because E(X) = 0 and 0 ≤ ζ < 1,
dWi
dσj
(
x, ζ = 1
)
≤ dWidσj
(
x, ζ
)
≤ dWidσj
(
x, ζ = 0
)
< 0
Therefore, a small increase in σj is costly to individual i.
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Abstract
This paper uses stated preference data to analyse the distribution of willingness
to pay for advanced traveller information systems and examine the implication of
certain model assumptions on the estimated distribution of willingness to pay. A
flexible estimation approach was used to estimate several models that vary in terms
of restrictions embodied into them. Although simpler and relatively more advanced
models yield nicely dispersed distribution for willingness to pay, this distribution
ceased to exist when certain restrictions are set free in a more advanced model. The
less restrictive model fitted the data better, and in this model, which combines the
latent class and mixed logit models, it turns out that the data do not reveal any
dispersion in willingness to pay. Results indicate that there is a group of travellers
with zero willingness to pay and another group that has a positive willingness to
pay. However, no dispersion of the willingness to pay was revealed within the second
group. Findings in this study illustrate the importance of model specification testing,
and that results regarding the estimated distribution of willingness to pay can be
highly dependent on restrictions built into the model.
Keywords: willingness to pay; advanced traveller information systems; flexible distribution;
intelligent transport systems; mixed logit; latent class
∗This paper is submitted to Transport Research Part C: Emerging Technologies. A previous version
of this paper was presented at the 94th Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board (TRB),
Washington, D.C., 11-14 January 2015.
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1 Introduction
In an increasingly mobile 21st century society, there is growing demand for travel informa-
tion. Travellers seek travel information as it can help them in decision making. It enables
them to make better choice of travel options such mode, route and departure time. It is
also demanded for network management. Advanced Traveller Information Systems (ATIS,
henceforth) have a potential to serve this demand. These systems acquire, analyse and
disseminate travel information which can improve driving experiences of individuals and
enhance overall network performance. Amid increasingly unpredictable travel conditions
ATIS could be of importance.
The current paper is concerned with estimating the distribution of willingness to pay
for several types of information that an ATIS could provide. Evidence on the willingness to
pay for ATIS is crucial in devising pricing strategies for its services and predicting market
demand. It also supports in the decision to introduce new systems and/or expand existing
ones (Stevens, 2004). Estimates of WTP may however depend on restrictions built into
the empirical model. This paper examines the distribution of WTP for ATIS and the
implication of certain restrictions embedded into the model on the estimated distribution
of WTP.
The paper has several contributions. Firstly, in contrast to previous research on the
WTP for ATIS (see Khattak et al. , 2003, for a review), the current paper examines
the overall distribution of willingness to pay for more customised facets of information.
Secondly, we employ a semi-nonparametric estimation approach (Fosgerau & Mabit, 2013)
that allows for a more flexible shape for the underlying distribution of willingness to pay
than the more commonly used estimation approaches, in which the shape of the distribution
is pre-determined. We also extend the Fosgerau & Mabit approach to estimate a combined
latent class – mixed logit model.
Analysis is based on data from a stated choice experiment designed to measure the
willingness to pay for three types of information that an ATIS could provide: information
about traffic accidents, congestion and roadworks. Each information type is expressed in
terms of levels containing location, delay and routing information with varying frequency of
updates. Data is collected using an internet questionnaire administered to 2000 respondents
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in Denmark.
We begin the analysis with a plain mixed logit model using a flexible distribution of
willingness to pay. This results in a nicely dispersed distribution of willingness to pay,
which however has a significant mass below zero. Negative willingness to pay, of course,
does not make any sense in our context. The second model presented therefore allows for a
point mass at zero. This model leads again to a nicely dispersed and positive distribution
of willingness to pay for those with a non-zero willingness to pay.
Analysis might have stopped here with what could seem to be a plausible result.
However, this model is very close to a latent class model comprising two classes: one
consisting of subjects with zero willingness to pay and a second class consisting of people
with non-zero willingness to pay. It embodies the restriction that the cost parameter is the
same in the two classes. Relaxing this restriction, allowing for separate cost parameters in
the two classes, has a drastic impact on results.
Relaxing the restriction on the cost parameters leads to a huge gain in log-likelihood
of 700 log-likelihood points, so the less restrictive model clearly fits the data better. In
this final model, it turns out that the data do not reveal any dispersion in the willingness
to pay for ATIS. Thus, our findings regarding the distribution of willingness to pay were
substantially affected by the last extension of the model. This illustrates the importance
of model specification testing, and that results regarding the estimated distribution of
willingness to pay can be highly dependent on restrictions built into the model.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the stated choice experiment
and data, while Section 3 and Section 4 outline the specification and estimation of the
discrete choice model. Model estimates and discussion of results is presented in Section 5,
followed by summary and conclusions in Section 6.
2 The Choice Experiment
The analysis is based on data from a stated choice survey designed to elicit willingness to
pay for different types of information that an ATIS might provide. Data was collected
using an internet questionnaire from respondents selected from an internet panel provided
by Userneeds, a Danish panel company. Members of the panel are recruited voluntarily to
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create a sample representative of the population.
The survey targeted Danish residents with a driving license who had a car in the
household for which they paid green owner tax. The green owner tax is an annual duty
paid by car owners based on the vehicle’s fuel efficiency aimed at reducing environmental
damage. This tax provides a way to define the cost of alternative ATIS in the choice
survey in reference to expenses incurred in real life.
Table 1: Attributes and their levels
Information types [t] Information levels [ü]
Information about [1] None
- [1] accidents [2] Location only
- [2] roadworks [3] Location & duration of delays updated every hour
- [3] congestion [4] Location & duration of delays updated every 30 minutes
[5] Location & duration of delays updated continuously
[6] Continuous update of location and duration of delays and
guidance to alternative routes
Cost Levels of the cost attribute are pivoted around green owner
tax at 0%, ±5%, -7%, ±10%, +15%, +23% and +33%
Moreover, the survey only considered those with recent driving experience so that
options in the choice experiment are more accurately envisaged. One is considered as
having a recent driving experience if he or she had driven a car in the 12 months preceding
the time of the survey. The final analysis is based on 2000 individuals who completed the
survey.
The survey presented each respondent with a choice between a pair of alternatives in a
series of six choice situations. Each alternative is characterised by its cost and the level of
three information types: information about traffic accidents, information about congestion
and information about roadworks. Each information type is expressed in terms of one of
six information levels as shown in Table 1. For every choice situation, the level of the
cost attribute is chosen at random from 9 options that represent a 0%, 5%, 7% or 10%
reduction in the green owner tax or a 5%, 10%, 15%, 23%, or 33% increase in this tax.
By construction, information levels are described in cumulative terms such that each
higher level includes everything from the lower level. As more is likely to be better
than less, we expect a higher information level would be more desirable. It is therefore
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straightforward to compare the relative desirability of different information levels associated
with a given information type.
Table 2: A snapshot of a choice screen
Which alternative do you prefer?
Alternative A Alternative B
Information about roadworks Location and expected delays
with continuous update
None
Information about congestion Location and expected delays
with update every half hour
Location only
Information about accidents None Location and expected delays
with continuous update
Your green tax DKK 2128 DKK 1440
 Alternative A  Alternative B
Table 2 shows a typical choice screen faced by a respondent who paid an annual
green tax of DKK 1600.1 In this choice situation, the respondent faced a choice between
information contained in alternative ‘A’ with a 33% increase in his/her green owner tax
and that contained in ‘B’ with a 10% reduction in green owner tax.
Table 3 shows the share of sample respondents by categories of respondent characteris-
tics. Accordingly, more than three quarters of respondents are from households earning
a gross annual income of DKK 0.2 million – DKK 1 million. As the survey targeted
individuals in households owning at least one car, the sample is likely to over-represent
respondents in more aﬄuent households. Our survey slightly under-represents those in
lower income groups compared to the Danish National Travel Survey (TU) data.
Since the survey targeted those with a driving license, each sample respondent was
at least 18 years old - the minimum driving age in Denmark. Table 3 shows that about
75% of respondents are aged between 45-64 years. Compared to the TU data, the survey
under-represents those in lower age brackets and over-represents those in the upper age
brackets. The sample also consists of more males (62.7%) than females (37.3%); who are
under-represented as compared to the TU data.
Moreover, the sample is not equally dispersed across different green tax levels with
50% of sample respondents paying DKK 1600 or DKK 3160 in green tax. This indicates
the popularity of small and medium size petrol cars in Denmark.
11 Euro is about DKK 7.5
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Table 3 also shows that about two in three respondents have full-time jobs (work at
least 30 hours a week); 6.2% have part-time jobs (work 9-29 hours per week) while 16.6%
are retired. The median respondent had encountered congestion or delays on at least 10%
of his or her trips. Only a small proportion of sample respondents reported to have faced
more frequent delays on their trip.
Table 3: Share of respondents by different covariates
Incomea Age (year) Green tax (DKK) Employment Encounter delays
Group Share Group Share Figure Share Status Share % Trips Share
< 200 2.05 18-23 1.15 1600 23.75 Full time 65.85 5 37.4
200-399 17.40 24-34 6.85 3160 26.25 Part time 6.2 10 15.75
400-599 23.05 35-44 12.35 5760 6.20 Not working 4.9 15-30 24.1
600-799 25.25 45-54 29.75 2000 12.65 Retired 16.6 35-50 11.85
800-999 13.10 55-59 19.4 3300 18.40 Student 2.15 55-70 3.35
> 1000 6.90 60-64 25.45 5280 5.80 Othersc 4.3 75-90 5.8
Othersb 12.25 65-69 4.95 Othersc 6.95 95-100 1.75
‘Share’ denotes percentage of sample respondents in each group
a Household income is in DKK’1000 per year
b These are records with missing income information
c Indicates labels other than those mentioned
3 Model Specification
When presented with a choice, respondents are assumed to evaluate the desirability of
each alternative based on its attributes (Lancaster, 1966) and choose the one that provide
them with the greatest utility. Let c be the cost of an alternative and xtü be the üth level
of the tth information type, where t = 1, 2, 3 and ü = 1, 2, . . . , 6 as shown in Table 1. Each
xtü is coded as a dummy variable. The utility to person n from alternative i can be written
as:
Uni = −θcni + Γ˜Xni + εni (1)
where X = (x1ü, x2ü, x3ü)ü is a vector of information levels, ε is a random error term and
Γ˜ = (γ˜1ü, γ˜2ü, γ˜3ü)ü and θ > 0 are parameters of the model.
Willingness to pay for a particular information level xtü is the ratio of its coefficient and
the cost coefficient: γ˜tü
θ
. In principle one can model unobserved heterogeneity in willingness
to pay by treating each of these ratios as a random variable. Practically however the
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resulting model would be intractable as it involves too many random parameters, one
associated with the coefficient of each information level.
For computational tractability, we allow heterogeneity in the attitude towards overall
services of ATIS while maintaining the weight of each information level constant across
individuals. That is, while the degree of importance attached to ATIS can vary from
individual to individual, the weight assigned to each information level is assumed constant
across them. Incorporating this and re-parametrising the model to obtain willingness to
pay estimates directly, the utility function can be written as:
Uni = θ [−cni + θβnΓXni] + εni (2)
where Γ = (γ1ü, γ2ü, γ3ü)ü and βn is a willingness to pay index which captures the overall
heterogeneity across individuals. This formulation is known as utility in willingness to
pay space (Train & Weeks, 2005; Hensher & Greene, 2011; Hole & Kolstad, 2012). The
willingness to pay for information level xtü is now βnγtü. The shape of the distribution of
willingness to pay is the same for all information levels; it is the scale of the distribution
that varies across information levels.
Suppose ε is i.i.d. type-one extreme value distribution with mean 0 and constant
variance pi26 . In the first model, Model A, we assume that β is i.i.d. across individuals
with a continuous distribution function Φ. Denoting by i the event that alternative i is
chosen in each of the q = 1, 2, . . . , 6 choice situations, an individual’s contribution to the
likelihood will be
Pn (i|Zn,Γ, θ) =
∫
G (Zn,Γ, θ, βn)φ (βn) dβn (3)
where Zn = (cn, Xn); G (Zn,Γ, θ, βn) =
∏
q g (Zniq,Γ, θ, βn) is the choice probability in a
sequence of choice situations where g (Γθ, βn) is the choice probability of the binary logit
model conditional on β.
Though this model leads to a nicely dispersed distribution of willingness to pay, the
distribution however has a significant mass below zero. The estimated willingness to pay
assumes negative values for a non-trivial share of the sampled population. Since negative
willingness to pay does not make sense, a point mass at zero is allowed in order to restrict
willingness to pay within a permissible range.
The next model, Model B, allows for a point mass at zero by assuming that the sample
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is drawn from a population consisting of two latent classes. In the first class (k = 1)
are individuals who attach importance to information attributes, while the second class
(k = 2) consists of those who deemed these attributes are unimportant. Subsequently,
the distribution of β among individuals in the first class is estimated, while β = 0 is
maintained in the second class.
At this point, we have two layers of heterogeneity - a continuous variation of willingness
to pay within the first class and a discrete segmentation of the sample into the two classes.
To capture both within and across class heterogeneity, we used a mixed logit latent class
model (Bujosa et al. , 2010; Greene & Hensher, 2012). This model combines the merits
of both the latent class and the continuous mixture models.
Suppose that class membership probabilities are independent of Z. If pik denotes the
probability of membership of the kth class for k = 1, 2, and f is the density of β in the
first class, the choice probability in a sequence of choice situations will be
Pn (i|Zn,Γ, θ, pi2) = pi2G (Zn, θ, βn = 0) + (1− pi2)
∫
G (Zn,Γ, θ, βn) f (βn) dβn (4)
Since class membership probabilities must add up to one, pi2 is estimated with pi1 = 1− pi2.
Hence, pi2 indicates the probability of a zero willingness to pay as opposed to a non-zero
amount. Except allowing for a point mass at zero this model is equivalent to Model A.
Model B embodies the restriction that the cost parameter is equal for the two classes.
Generally, however, the parameter could differ between the classes indicating class-specific
responsiveness to the cost attribute. Model B is thus extended to allow for class-specific
cost parameters. An individual’s contribution to the likelihood in this model, labelled
Model C, is
Pn (i|Zn,Γ, θ1, θ2, pi2) = pi2G (Zn, θ2, βn = 0) + (1− pi2)
∫
G (Zn,Γ, θ1, βn) f (βn) dβn (5)
which is similar to Model B except that it allows for class specific cost parameters.
4 Estimation
Since the choice probabilities in (3)-(5) allow no analytical expression, estimation is per-
formed using maximum simulated likelihood (Train, 2003). In most empirical applications,
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estimation proceeds by specifying a distribution for the random parameter and simulating
choice probabilities based on draws from this distribution. Therefore, prior knowledge of
the distribution is required to perform simulation.
It has been shown that estimates of willingness to pay from parametric models can be
sensitive to the assumed distribution, and that the choice of an inappropriate distribution
leads to bias (Hess et al. , 2005; Fosgerau & Bierlaire, 2007). Given our interest in the
distribution per se, it is imperative to mitigate the risk of bias as a result of the assumed
shape of the distribution. Most importantly, it is undesirable to impose the shape of the
distribution when one seeks to estimate the distribution as such.
In this paper, we employed a semi-nonparametric estimation approach proposed by
Fosgerau & Mabit (2013) that allows a more flexible distribution for the random parameter.
As opposed to specifying an ex ante distribution, this approach asserts that the distribution
of a random parameter can be simulated given deep parameters that are estimated along
with other parameters of the model. This approach is simple to implement and it can
approximate essentially any distribution.
Under this approach, simulation is performed using draws of the random parameter
computed based on draws from any distribution and transforming these draws using a
polynomial series. To illustrate, suppose u = (u1, u2, . . . , uR) is a vector of R independent
draws from a standardised uniform distribution, U(0, 1); and that u is uncorrelated with
other covariates in the model. Then, a draw of the random parameter is computed as
β(r) =
M∑
m=0
αmu
m
r (6)
wherem = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,M and α = (α0, α1, . . . , αM) is a vector of deep parameters estimated
along with other parameters of the model. The likelihood is simulated conditional on
draws computed in (6).
Though a polynomial of higher degree provides more flexibility in shape, it however
poses a serious problem in estimation by inducing correlation among different terms of
the polynomial. Even with a polynomial of degree 2 based on draws u from a standard
uniform distribution, the correlation between the terms u and u2, is 0.97. The problem of
correlation can be reduced by using orthogonal polynomials (Fosgerau & Mabit, 2013).
We use orthonormal Legendre polynomials proposed by Bierens (2008). These polyno-
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mials are mutually orthogonal in the interval [0, 1], i.e.,
∫ 1
0
Lm(u)Lm′(u) du =
 0 if m Ó= m
′
1 if m = m′
(7)
where Lm(u) is the mth Legendre polynomial on u defined recursively by
Lm (u) =
√
4m2 − 1
m
(2u− 1)Lm−1 (u)− (m− 1)
√
2m+ 1
m
√
2m− 3 Lm−2 (u) (8)
starting from L0 (u) = 1 and L1 (u) =
√
3 (2u− 1). Given orthogonal Legendre polynomi-
als, the rth draw of β is now computed as
β(r) =
M∑
m=0
αmLm(u) (9)
which is used in simulation instead of the draws u
Given α and R draws of β, the cumulative distribution of β is approximated by
F (λ) Ä 1
R
∑R
r=1 1
{
β(r)n < λ
}
where the summand equals 1 if the expression inside the
curly brackets is true or 0 otherwise.
The shape of the estimated willingness to pay distribution is determined by the number
of deep parameters specified. Each model is estimated by specifying varying number of
deep parameters to achieve more flexibility in the estimated distribution; estimation results
are shown in Appendix A.
For a given M , Models A, B and C are nested. Model A is a restricted version of
Model B with the restriction being pi2 = 0; and Model B is a special case of Model C
where θ1 = θ2 is maintained. For each model, the best specification regarding the degree
of the approximating polynomial is chosen based on the likelihood ratio test. It turns
out that the best specification for these models is associated with different degrees of
approximating polynomials.
For different degrees of approximating polynomials, Models A, B and C are non-nested.
Subsequently, the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is used to test for model selection
among these models. The BIC is defined as BIC = −2L+df ln (N) where N is the number
of observations, L is the value of log-likelihood at convergence and df is the number of
degrees of freedom. Accordingly, the model with the least BIC value is preferred.
All models are estimated on the full sample of 2,000 individuals using 1,000 Halton
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draws in Biogeme (Bierlaire, 2003). Estimates remain stable for changes in starting values
and the number of draws in estimation. Assuming that an individual’s preferences are
constant over a sequence of choice situations, the same draws are used for a sequence of
choices belonging to a given individual.
For numerical reasons, the level of the cost attribute is divided by 100 with estimated
willingness to pay figures expressed in DKK 100 per year. For each information type t, the
information level ‘None’ is taken as a base category with the corresponding γt1 normalised
to zero. Moreover, γ12 is normalised to one to provide identification.
To test whether there was a tendency of respondents choosing the option on the same
side of the choice screen to simplify decision making, a dummy was included for the
left-hand side alternative. Based on the preferred specification under Model A, we did not
find evidence supporting this tendency. Moreover, since alternatives in the choice set are
unlabelled, in the sense that they all represent virtual ATIS, neither alternative specific
coefficients nor alternative specific constants are relevant in our analysis.
5 Results and Discussion
Table 4 shows the preferred set of estimates under Models A, B and C along with estimates
from a corresponding binary logit model. For Model A, though specifications based on
the fifth and sixth degree polynomials outperform the specification based on the fourth
degree polynomial, the latter is preferred as estimates of certain target coefficients under
the former become statistically insignificant. For Model B, since the specification based
on the sixth and higher degree polynomials failed to converge, the specification based on
the fifth degree polynomial is preferred. For Model C, the specification based on the first
degree approximating polynomial is chosen since it outperforms specifications based on
higher degree polynomials.
In all models, estimates of pi2, each γtü and the cost parameters are statistically
significant and have the expected positive sign. Moreover, all the estimated polynomial
coefficients, except for α1 under Model C, are significant. The values of log-likelihood
indicate that Model C provided a much higher improvement in model fit compared to all
other models. It provided an impressive 700 additional log-likelihood units compared to
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Model B. The overall fit of Model C is a significant improvement over all other models
based on the BIC index; according to which Model B outperforms Model A, and the latter
is preferred to the binary logit model.
Table 4: Preferred set of estimates from alternative models
Binary logit Model A Model B Model C
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
γ13 0.61 7.48 0.99 11.58 0.95 5.81 0.90 13.34
γ14 0.90 11.03 1.22 8.25 1.17 4.51 1.17 16.79
γ15 0.95 11.09 1.53 11.77 1.62 8.94 1.31 17.98
γ16 1.37 14.13 1.83 10.45 1.89 7.69 1.62 16.95
γ22 0.15 2.28 0.51 4.74 0.50 4.31 0.55 8.83
γ23 0.48 6.16 0.86 5.39 0.90 8.38 0.81 10.92
γ24 0.50 6.22 1.04 5.10 1.17 7.37 0.70 9.53
γ25 0.47 5.72 0.93 4.87 1.06 6.46 0.70 9.40
γ26 0.66 6.91 1.49 5.90 1.67 10.50 1.12 12.16
γ32 0.63 8.42 0.93 3.88 1.08 15.07 0.84 12.25
γ33 0.70 8.83 1.08 5.13 1.23 10.47 0.80 12.02
γ34 0.71 7.91 1.56 4.33 1.82 8.96 1.07 12.85
γ35 1.06 11.09 1.59 6.11 1.73 9.57 1.15 13.31
γ36 1.05 10.86 1.65 5.29 1.85 6.23 1.42 15.20
θ 0.16 37.74 0.19 20.63 0.19 24.64
θ1 0.06 7.91
θ2 0.78 10.28
pi2 0.73 22.80 0.53 23.80
α0 4.42 15.66 5.16 7.86 31.70 2.60 19.60 7.50
α1 6.12 9.33 34.60 2.08 0.00† 0.00†
α2 5.98 8.95 38.60 2.40
α3 4.65 7.50 29.80 2.38
α4 2.98 4.68 20.10 2.48
α5 11.60 3.58
L -6669.39 -6526.78 -6506.23 -5809.06
df 16 20 22 19
BIC 13489.06 13241.42 13219.10 11796.59
Obs. 12000 12000 12000 12000
† Assumes zero for several digits after the decimal.
Results in Table 4 indicate that, in general, a higher willingness to pay is estimated
for more desirable information levels and for information about accidents and congestion.
The attribute level containing real-time location, delay and routing information has
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the highest estimated weight, which when averaged across the three information types
exceeds the estimated weight of the attribute level containing real-time location and delay
information by over 25%. Weights of the two information levels signify the importance of
guidance to alternative routes over and above real-time delay and location information
(Kim & Vandebona, 1999).
In some cases, however, the estimated ranking of information levels is inconsistent. In
most cases where this is true, the difference between the relevant coefficients is insignificant.
The anomalous ranking could be caused by the inability to fully process the differences
between some of the information levels.
For a given information level, weights assigned to different information types indicate
their relative importance. In general, estimates suggest a higher willingness to pay for
information about congestion and accidents than for information about roadworks. This
is conceivable considering the fact that plans for road construction and maintenance are
often advertised through media and roadside posters hence are hardly ‘news’ to drivers.
The implied distribution of willingness to pay is simulated conditional on parameter
estimates in Table 4. Since the binary logit model does not permit unobserved heterogeneity,
the willingness to pay index, β, under this model corresponds simply to α0. This model is
a special case of Model A where all coefficients, except the constant α0, of the polynomial
approximation of φ are constrained to zero.
For Models A, B and C, the willingness to pay index is allowed to vary in the population.
Conditional on estimates of deep parameters, the implied distribution of the willingness
to pay index is simulated using 1,000,000 random draws. The cumulative probability
distribution curve of simulated willingness to pay indexes is depicted in Figure 1; while
the mean and some quantiles of the simulated distribution are shown in Table 5.
Under Model A, the estimated distribution is nicely dispersed and right-skewed. The
model predicted a higher probability for lower values of willingness to pay and a positive
probability for negative values of the willingness to pay. As is apparent in Figure 1, the
estimated distribution has a considerable mass below zero with more than one in five
simulated willingness to pay values being negative. Given our expectation of a non-negative
willingness to pay, we conclude that this model is misspecified.
Model B overcomes this misspecification by allowing for a point mass at zero. It
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Figure 1: Simulated cumulative distribution curves of willingness to pay index
restricted willingness to pay values to a non-negative interval, and predicted a higher
(72.5%) probability for having a zero willingness to pay which corresponds to the height
of the spike at zero. This indicates that a greater proportion of sampled individuals are
unwilling to pay for travel information. This disinclination to pay for ATIS is consistent
with previous empirical literature (Polydoropoulou et al. , 1997; Kim & Vandebona, 1999;
Wolinetz et al. , 2001; Khattak et al. , 2003) who gave evidence for a low willingness to
pay for ATIS. Over a common support, the shape of the distribution of willingness to pay
under Model B is comparable to that under Model A. In both bases, the distribution rises
rapidly before it flattened out to the right.
Model C relaxed a restriction under Model B by allowing for separate cost parameters
in the two classes. The difference between the estimates of the two cost parameters is
significant implying that those unwilling to pay for travel information are more sensitive
to the cost of ATIS.
Allowing for separate cost parameters in the two classes led to a huge improvement in
log-likelihood of 700 log-likelihood units, so Model C clearly fits the data better. Model
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Table 5: Certain features of willingness to pay index distribution
Mean Quantiles
5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95%
Model A 5.16 -0.57 -0.44 0.09 1.64 2.68 18.68 31.95
Model B 9.72 0 0 0 0 3.75 13.23 30.37
Model C 9.24 0 0 0 0 19.61 19.61 19.61
Values are in DKK 100 per year
C is also preferred to Model B based on the BIC. The extension in this model, that the
cost parameter is allowed to differ between the two classes, had a drastic impact on the
estimated distribution.
In this final model, the data does not reveal any dispersion in willingness to pay across
those willing to pay a non-zero amount. This is apparent from the estimate of α2, which is
too small to induce any meaningful variation in willingness to pay within the population.
This suggests that the nicely dispersed distribution of willingness to pay from Model B is
a result of the assumed homogeneity of the cost parameter in the two classes.
In essence, Model C is reduced to a fixed parameter latent class model. As such, the
model led to a discrete distribution for willingness to pay. Estimates indicate a probability
of 53% that willingness to pay equals zero and a probability of 47% that it takes the fixed
estimated non-zero value. Thus, our findings regarding the distribution of willingness to
pay were very substantially affected by the last extension of the model.
The analysis regarding the distribution of willingness to pay has several implications.
Firstly, it illustrates the importance of model specification testing. Had we not allowed
for and subsequently tested the possibility of a separate cost parameter between the two
classes, our conclusion regarding the distribution of willingness to pay would have been
based on estimates from Model B. However, results in Model C indicate that the seemingly
dispersed distribution of willingness to pay from Model B is purely spurious, and is induced
by the imposition of equal cost parameters in the two classes.
Secondly, the analysis also illustrates that our conclusion regarding the estimated
distribution of willingness to pay can be highly dependent on restrictions built into the
model. Though several models are estimated, some more general than others with regard
to assumptions embedded, neither one of them produced results consistent with the other.
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An unbounded distribution in Model A caused a misspecification; Model B addressed the
misspecification and led to a seemingly dispersed distribution of willingness to pay, which
ceased to exist once Model C allowed for separate cost coefficients in the two classes.
6 Summary and Conclusion
Based on data acquired by means of a stated choice survey from 2,000 drivers in Denmark,
this paper reports results from the analysis of the distribution of willingness to pay for an
ATIS which could provide location, delay and routing information about three causes of
unpredicted travel delays: traffic accidents, roadworks and congestion.
The analysis, in general, indicates that a significant share of drivers have a zero
willingness to pay for ATIS, and that among those willing to pay a non-zero amount,
the willingness to pay is distributed fairly tightly. Moreover, the willingness to pay for
information about congestion and traffic accidents is higher than that for information
about roadworks.
The distribution is estimated employing a discrete choice model in which willingness to
pay is treated as a random variable. Analysis began with a simple mixed logit model using
a flexible unbounded distribution of willingness to pay. This resulted in a nicely dispersed
distribution of willingness to pay, which however had significant mass below zero.
We therefore allowed for a point mass at zero in a subsequent mixed logit-latent class
model in order to address the misspecification. In this model, the sample is assumed to
have been drawn from a population comprising of one group (class) of subjects with zero
willingness to pay and another group with a non-zero willingness to pay. This model led
again to a nicely dispersed and positive distribution of willingness to pay for those with
non-zero willingness to pay.
This seemingly plausible result, however, ceased to exist when an assumption embedded
in the model, namely that the cost parameter is the same in the two classes, was relaxed
in a subsequent model. In this final model, wherein separate cost parameters are allowed
in the two classes, the data does not reveal any dispersion of the willingness to pay for
ATIS among those willing to pay a non-zero amount. This indicates that our conclusions
in the previous model were affected by restrictions on the cost parameters.
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The analysis illustrates the importance of model specification testing, and that results
regarding the estimated distribution of willingness to pay can be highly dependent on
restrictions built into the model. When inferring behavioural values such as willingness
to pay, we shall therefore be alert to the possibility that seemingly plausible results from
simpler (and even fairly advanced) models could be driven by restrictions embedded in
these models. Though results from simpler models seemed manifested by the data, it is
essential to thoroughly examine how much they rely on restrictions.
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A Appendix
Table 6: Estimates from Model A with varying degrees of approximating polynomials
M = 1 M = 2 M = 3 M = 4 M = 5 M = 6
Est. t-val Est. t-val Est. t-val Est. t-val Est. t-val Est. t-val
γ13 0.89 7.31 0.96 11.88 0.97 11.73 0.99 11.58 1.02 7.95 1.07 1.37
γ14 1.16 8.73 1.19 10.89 1.20 8.76 1.22 8.25 1.23 8.34 1.27 1.05
γ15 1.39 13.45 1.46 16.78 1.50 17.12 1.53 11.77 1.56 5.18 1.62 2.75
γ16 1.65 8.89 1.73 14.15 1.76 14.84 1.83 10.45 1.90 3.98 2.03 1.96
γ22 0.54 6.55 0.56 7.16 0.52 6.89 0.51 4.74 0.53 1.44 0.63 1.02
γ23 0.89 7.59 0.92 8.83 0.88 8.04 0.86 5.39 0.85 1.65 0.92 1.44
γ24 1.10 8.37 1.11 8.63 1.05 7.71 1.04 5.10 1.06 1.56 1.15 4.03
γ25 0.96 8.04 1.00 10.07 0.96 9.01 0.93 4.87 0.93 1.34 1.05 1.31
γ26 1.36 9.12 1.49 11.09 1.48 10.08 1.49 5.90 1.53 2.16 1.70 3.50
γ32 0.97 6.98 0.99 7.90 0.96 5.90 0.93 3.88 0.95 2.33 1.02 3.44
γ33 1.09 8.43 1.14 9.65 1.11 8.59 1.08 5.13 1.08 1.94 1.15 4.12
γ34 1.48 8.35 1.57 8.91 1.57 7.35 1.56 4.33 1.58 1.64 1.68 3.85
γ35 1.49 10.54 1.57 10.80 1.59 9.39 1.59 6.11 1.62 2.69 1.73 10.30
γ36 1.57 11.63 1.63 10.92 1.64 9.05 1.65 5.29 1.68 2.06 1.84 1.98
θ 0.18 23.70 0.19 22.72 0.19 21.91 0.19 20.63 0.19 15.73 0.20 10.36
α0 3.83 8.91 4.52 9.73 4.90 9.19 5.16 7.86 5.39 8.26 6.18 1.37
α1 5.98 12.35 5.87 12.40 5.97 11.16 6.12 9.33 6.51 3.28 6.60 0.84
α2 4.68 12.93 5.39 12.05 5.98 8.95 6.48 4.30 8.92 1.24
α3 3.74 10.61 4.65 7.50 5.48 2.69 6.56 0.83
α4 2.98 4.68 4.00 1.44 7.22 1.44
α5 1.87 0.90 3.51 0.82
α6 3.49 1.92
L -6620.09 -6563.86 -6536.82 -6526.78 -6524.46 -6520.43
df 17 18 19 20 21 22
BIC 13399.85 13296.80 13252.09 13241.42 13246.16 13247.50
Obs. 12000 12000 12000 12000 12000 12000
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Table 7: Estimates from Model B with varying degrees of approximating polynomials
M = 1 M = 2 M = 3 M = 4 M = 5
Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat
γ13 0.99 11.37 1.03 1.37 0.93 7.72 0.93 8.85 0.95 5.81
γ14 1.19 9.03 1.23 1.13 1.10 6.52 1.12 6.81 1.17 4.51
γ15 1.54 15.70 1.73 1.05 1.62 12.19 1.61 14.18 1.62 8.94
γ16 1.79 13.11 2.04 1.30 1.89 11.09 1.87 12.71 1.89 7.69
γ22 0.53 7.10 0.58 5.05 0.50 6.10 0.48 6.80 0.50 4.31
γ23 0.90 8.13 0.94 5.33 0.89 12.24 0.89 13.70 0.90 8.38
γ24 1.07 7.69 1.32 0.81 1.22 8.53 1.17 11.18 1.17 7.37
γ25 1.00 10.08 1.10 1.18 1.05 9.97 1.04 11.62 1.06 6.46
γ26 1.54 11.24 1.70 2.67 1.66 15.33 1.65 16.68 1.67 10.50
γ32 1.03 6.96 1.17 1.36 1.12 16.79 1.08 18.00 1.08 15.07
γ33 1.17 8.68 1.34 0.98 1.25 12.76 1.22 14.78 1.23 10.47
γ34 1.68 7.85 2.04 0.80 1.87 10.83 1.81 13.36 1.82 8.96
γ35 1.66 9.21 1.88 1.42 1.75 12.72 1.71 13.34 1.73 9.57
γ36 1.73 9.28 2.02 0.87 1.84 8.67 1.81 9.26 1.85 6.23
pi 0.75 25.68 0.75 1.93 0.75 26.16 0.73 22.80 0.69 13.70
θ 0.19 23.89 0.19 16.47 0.19 24.56 0.19 24.64 0.19 24.57
α0 17.30 8.55 20.20 0.41 27.20 4.05 31.90 3.93 31.70 2.60
α1 10.00 8.61 15.50 0.32 25.30 3.20 33.80 3.25 34.60 2.08
α2 0 0 10.30 0.50 21.10 3.72 31.90 3.46 38.60 2.40
α3 0 0 0 0 11.20 4.74 22.50 3.89 29.80 2.38
α4 0 0 0 0 0 0 11.70 4.48 20.10 2.48
α5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11.60 3.58
L -6537.85 -6526.601 -6515.197 -6508.709 -6506.231
df 18 19 20 21 22
BIC 13244.76791 13231.66258 13218.24724 13214.6639 13219.10056
Obs. 12000 12000 12000 12000 12000
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Table 8: Estimates from Model C with varying degrees of approximating polynomials
M = 1 M = 2 M = 3 M = 4
Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat
γ13 0.90 13.34 0.90 13.35 0.90 13.35 0.90 13.35
γ14 1.17 16.79 1.17 16.79 1.17 16.79 1.17 16.79
γ15 1.31 17.98 1.31 18.01 1.31 18.01 1.31 18.01
γ16 1.62 16.95 1.62 16.96 1.62 16.96 1.62 16.96
γ22 0.55 8.83 0.55 8.83 0.55 8.83 0.55 8.83
γ23 0.81 10.92 0.81 10.91 0.81 10.91 0.81 10.91
γ24 0.70 9.53 0.70 9.54 0.70 9.54 0.70 9.54
γ25 0.70 9.40 0.70 9.41 0.70 9.41 0.70 9.41
γ26 1.12 12.16 1.12 12.16 1.12 12.16 1.12 12.16
γ32 0.84 12.25 0.84 12.24 0.84 12.24 0.84 12.25
γ33 0.80 12.02 0.80 11.99 0.80 11.99 0.80 12.00
γ34 1.07 12.85 1.07 12.86 1.07 12.86 1.07 12.85
γ35 1.15 13.31 1.14 13.30 1.14 13.30 1.14 13.30
γ36 1.42 15.20 1.41 15.19 1.41 15.19 1.41 15.19
pi 0.53 23.80 0.53 23.76 0.53 23.76 0.53 23.77
θ1 0.78 10.28 0.78 10.26 0.78 10.26 0.78 10.27
θ1 0.06 7.91 0.06 7.90 0.06 7.90 0.06 7.90
θ2 0.78 10.28 0.78 10.26 0.78 10.26 0.78 10.27
α0 19.60 7.50 19.60 7.50 19.60 7.50 19.60 7.50
α1 -1.5e-3 0.00 -5.2e-6 0.00 2.25e-06 0.86 -4.2e-06 -0.58
α2 1.20 0.67 1.20 0.67 1.18 0.72
α3 0.00 -0.77 0.00 0.80
α4 -0.39 -0.33
L -5809.06 -5809.02 -5809.02 -5809.02
df 19 20 21 22
BIC 11796.59 11805.90 11815.29 11824.68
Obs. 12000 12000 12000 12000
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Abstract
Firm relocation can induce job mobility decisions through its effect on the
commuting distance for workers. Using Danish register data, we investigate the effect
of relocation distance on worker turnover at the firm level. We find a positive and
significant but moderate effect. Results in the paper establish that, on average, a 10
km increase in relocation distance leads to a 2–4 percent increase in the annual rate
of worker turnover at the firm level over three years, including the year of relocation.
Results also show that firms having a higher share of male, more experienced and
higher educated workers face lower worker turnover, as do firms located closer to
their workers.
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1 Introduction
Firm relocation affects the commute patterns for existing workers. In fact, the sustained
trend of firm relocation farther from residences, and often towards suburbs, has increased
the average commute distance for workers (Kneebone & Holmes, 2015). The time and
money costs of increased commuting can influence the choice of residential location (e.g.
Zax, 1991; van Ommeren et al. , 1999; Clark et al. , 2003), job search location (e.g.
Immergluck, 1998; Kneebone & Holmes, 2015), travel mode as well as car ownership
decisions. Most importantly for the purpose of this paper, firm relocation can also induce
job mobility due to high costs of residential mobility and long distance commuting.
Past research suggests that job mobility decisions are partly motivated by commuting
distance considerations (Levinson, 1997; Immergluck, 1998). This paper examines the
extent to which the relocation distance of moving firms is related to worker turnover.
Despite past research on the effect of commuting distance on job moving behaviour (e.g.
van Ommeren et al. , 1999; Clark et al. , 2003; Deding et al. , 2009), analysis has typically
been at the individual worker level.1 As a result, little is known about the nature and
extent of this relationship at the firm level. Investigating the relationship at the firm level
is essential as it shows the aggregated effect of various individual-level decisions. Besides,
since the effect of relocation on job mobility decisions is likely to depend on relocation
distance, it is not until this effect is quantified that employers of moving firms can control
worker turnover, a key indicator of the firm’s costs of hiring and training workers, through
an optimally chosen relocation distance.
Conceivably, the effect of relocation on worker turnover depends on whether, and how
far, the firm moves closer to its workers. If residences are concentrated and a firm moves
towards its workers, then the relocation shortens commutes to all workers. When this is
the case, the relocation distance is unlikely to induce job mobility unless the pre-relocation
commute distance was optimally chosen and that, any deviation from that is undesirable.
In most cases, however, relocation has losers and winners since it shortens the commuting
distance for some workers while lengthening the commutes for others. For those who lost
1A notable exception is Zax & Kain (1996) who studied the effect of relocation distance on job mobility
based on data from a single firm. As opposed to them, we considered the entire population of firms in
Denmark.
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from relocation, longer relocation distance leads to longer commutes suggesting a positive
relationship between relocation distance and worker turnover.
One may argue that employers can contemplate the effect of relocation distance on
workers and that they would offer compensation in order to keep their important employees.
To the extent this argument holds, the relationship between relocation distance and worker
turnover may not be as hypothesised. However, we believe that the hypothesised positive
relation holds due to the following reasons. Firstly, firms may not be willing to compensate
workers in all situations. Secondly, although employers compensate workers for commuting
costs, evidence suggests that workers are only partially compensated (Manning, 2003;
Mulalic et al. , 2013). Moreover, even when employers pay higher wages to prevent workers
from leaving, some workers may have to move residence to stay with the firm. However,
this may not be possible due to factors that restrict residence mobility such as social
attachment to places (Dahl & Sorenson, 2010); or due to high costs of moving residences. In
such circumstances, job mobility is a more feasible option to reduce commuting distances.
The analysis in the current paper is based on matched employer-employee information
from Danish register-based data for the years 2000–2007. The dataset consists of the
entire population of firms and their employees. A characteristic feature of the Danish
labour market is the high rate of job mobility. Every year, about 25 percent of workers
in the labour force move jobs (Albak & Sørensen, 1998; Commission, 2006; Eriksson &
Westergaard-Nielsen, 2009), a rate which is high even by OECD standards. It can therefore
be costly for firms to lose additional workers due to long distance relocation, given the
high rate of worker mobility.
Estimation is performed on a combined sample of relocated and non-relocated firms by
including a dummy indicator for relocation. This is done to examine whether relocation
distance captures the effect of the firm’s relocation per se, and possible restructuring that
follows. Our estimates indicate that, after controlling for relocation distance, there is
no significant difference in worker turnover between relocated and non-relocated firms.
Therefore, relocation distance is not picking up the effect of firm relocation as such.
We find a moderate but significant effect of relocation distance on worker turnover.
Results in the paper establish that, on average, a 10 km increase in relocation distance
leads to a 2–4 percent increase in the annual rate of worker turnover at the firm level over
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a period of three years, including the year of relocation. The estimated effect is stronger in
the first year after relocation and pales away after the third year as workers more or less
fully adjust to the change. The effect in the year of relocation is expected to be smaller as
some firms could have relocated late in the year allowing little time for workers to adjust.
The fact that we obtain a significant effect could suggest that workers probably knew
about the relocation decision ahead of time, such that they could search other jobs and
move before or soon after the firm relocated.
Besides relocation distance, our model includes various pre-relocation characteristics as
additional controls. These are firm related features and worker characteristics aggregated at
the firm level. One such control variable is the average commuting distance of workers in a
firm, for which we obtain a significant, positive coefficient indicating that, on average, firms
that are located farther from their employees face higher worker turnover. Interestingly,
this coefficient is in the same order of magnitude as the coefficient associated with relocation
distance. The analysis also show that firms with a higher share of workers having children
face, on average, lower worker turnover. Results also show that firms having a higher share
of male, more experienced and higher educated workers face lower worker turnover, as do
firms located closer to their workers.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes two important
variables in the analysis: measures of worker turnover and a firm’s relocation distance. In
Section 3, we outline a description of the data as well as summary statistics on important
variables. Section 4 shows estimation results and discusses findings from the analysis. We
carry out a sensitivity analysis in Section 5 while the last section concludes.
2 Worker turnover and relocation distance
2.1 Relocation distance
We do not have information about the move distance of relocated firms readily available in
the data. Neither were we able to infer this information from firm and residence addresses
since street names (and numbers) are not provided in the data to protect worker and
firm privacy. Therefore, we do not have the true distance of relocation. We estimate the
distance of firm relocation as follows. First, we observe the relocation status of a firm
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based on over-the-year change in its registered address.2 Since the commuting distances of
workers for the shortest route between residence and workplace location is provided, we
use this information to compute the move distance of relocated firms. Figure 1 illustrates
the use of the available information to derive information on relocation distance.
 
 
 
Figure 1: Computation of a firm’s relocation distance
Assume that worker residences are distributed in the space surrounding the firm. We
focus on workers who did not change employer and residence during the base year. This
ensures that changes in commuting distance are due to the firm relocation and not caused
by residential relocation or a job change. Now consider the example illustrated in Figure 1.
In this figure, we consider the relocation distance of a firm that relocated from point A to
B. It is easy to see that the longest (absolute) change in worker commuting distance (in our
figure for worker w1) is a good candidate for the estimate of the firm’s relocation distance
and it is always a lower bound for this distance.3 We estimate a firm’s relocation distance
using the largest absolute change in worker commuting distance. To test for robustness of
our estimate, we re-compute the measure of relocation distance after removing observations
2We observe a pseudo, not actual address of firms and residence locations.
3Since this measure of relocation distance can be affected by firm size, we have controlled for the
number of workers and excluded small firms from the analysis.
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with the largest absolute change in commuting distance. Our results turn out to be stable
suggesting that the measure is robust.
 
Figure 2: Distribution of relocated firms by distance of relocation
Figure 2 shows the distribution of firm relocation distance in the sample. The distribu-
tion is skewed to the right since most relocated firms in the sample moved within a short
distance from their initial location. The average relocation distance for relocated firms is
about 7 km while its median is 2 km. About 83 percent of relocations took place within
10 km distance; 98 percent within 50 km; and only 12 firms relocated more than 100 km
away.
2.2 Worker turnover
Worker turnover measures the number of workers separating from their firm during a
particular period. Often, it is calculated as a proportion of workers leaving a firm in a
given year out of the total number of workers who were with the firm in that year. For
the purpose of this paper, however, we define worker turnover rates based on the number
of workers at a firm at the beginning of a base year, the year in which we observe a
firm’s relocation status. This is done to distinguish workers who were with the firm before
its relocation from new workers who are recruited after the relocation, as the latter are
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unaffected by the relocation. We refer to the base year as year 0 and subsequent years as
year 1, year 2 and year 3, consecutively.
To formally define worker turnover rate as used in this paper, let Nt be the number
of workers that a firm has at the beginning of a base year, t, and Lt,s be the number of
workers who were with the firm since the beginning of the base year and subsequently
exited in the year t+ s, where s = 0, 1, 2, 3. Then, we calculate the rate of worker turnover
as
rs =

Lt,0
Nt
for s = 0,
Lt,s
Nt−
∑
s
Lt,s−1
for s = 1, 2, 3
(1)
One can obtain the survival rate by subtracting the rate of worker turnover from one.4
In other words, the rate of worker turnover equals one less the proportion of stayers out of
those who were with the firm since the base year and stayed until the previous year. This
notion of worker turnover has two important features: (a) it distinguishes workers who
were with the firm before (a potential) relocation from new workers recruited after the
relocation; (b) it focuses only on workers who have stayed with the firm from the base year
until the beginning of the respective year, neglecting those who left the firm in between.
There are various reasons why workers separate from their employers, including volun-
tary quits initiated by workers, retirements, death, disability, layoffs and closing down of a
firm. Ideally, we wish to model the extent to which relocation distance affects voluntary
job moves. Unfortunately, however, we do not distinguish reasons for separation in the
dataset. As a result, our definition of worker turnover can also include involuntary layoffs,
deaths and disability. Nevertheless, it does not include separations due to closing firms as
we considered continuing establishments alone.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
3.1 The data
The analysis is based on Danish register data obtained from Statistics Denmark. The
data contains information about all workers and all firms in the country. We used a
4The rate of survival rate measures the proportion of workers who stays with their firm.
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Table 1: Firms across years and by relocation status
Year Number of firms Relocated firms
Frequency Share from total
2001 11,961 237 1.98
2002 12,933 296 2.29
2003 12,799 274 2.14
2004 12,756 277 2.17
2005 12,797 153 1.20
2006 12,881 302 2.34
2007 11,877 273 2.30
matched employee-employer data for the years 2000–2007. We exclude small firms, those
with less than 10 workers in each one of the years in the sample, for different reasons.
Firstly, factors that induce relocation and turnover decisions in small, and often self- and
family-owned establishments tend to differ from factors that influence these decisions in
larger firms. If these factors are not observed in the data, they can cause bias. Secondly,
as individual workers can highly influence relocation decisions in small firms, a change
in workplace location could be self-motivated, and hence it may not induce behavioural
response in terms of job mobility. As Mulalic et al. (2013) argued, however, relocation
decisions in large firms can be considered exogenous from the perspective of individual
workers. Moreover, although all employers could contemplate the effect of relocation on
their workers, small firms could have higher tendency to do so, and this induce serious
bias in estimation.
By construction, firms that are not observed in the dataset at least for two consecutive
years are excluded from the analysis. Although most relocated firms did relocate only once
during the sample period, some (about 10 percent of relocated firms) relocated several
times during the period under consideration. For firms that relocated multiple times
during the sample period, the outcome of interest is subject to multiple shocks hence it
is difficult to attribute the effect to one of the relocations. Therefore, we do not include
them in the analysis. Although we have no justification, it shall be commented that, for
year 2005, a share of relocated firms is relatively lower.
The total number of unique firms in our sample is 14,923; and this figure fluctuates
between 11,877 and 12,933 in a given year (see Table 1). Overall, about 12 percent of
87
firms had relocated during the sample period. The share of relocated firms varies between
1.20% and 2.34% of the total number of firms in any given year in the sample.
3.2 Worker turnover rates
Although there is some variation in the average rate of worker turnover over time, the
difference is generally very small (see Table 8 in the Appendix). On average, about
21% of workers in a non-relocated firm have left during a given year. This figure ranges
from about 20 to 25% in any given year in the sample. For firms relocated within 3 km
(21.6%) or more than 3 km away (23.2%), the average rate of worker turnover is higher
(see Table 9 in the Appendix for a summary statistics of the rate of worker turnover).
Interestingly, we do not find significant difference in the average rate of worker turnover
between non-relocated firms and firms relocated within short distance (3 km).5 This
indicates that relocation distance is not subsuming the effect of restructuring of the firm
following relocation. Generally, relocated firms have pre-relocation characteristics that are
largely similar to non-relocated firms.
Survival rates decline over time irrespective of a firm’s relocation status, i.e., a declining
share of workers who stayed since a base year (year 0) had eventually left the firm. Out
of all workers with a firm at the start of a base year, about 21% left in the same year,
while 14%, 10.6% and 8.6% left in the following three years, consecutively. In other
words, a typical firm loses 35% of its workers in two years, 45.7% in three years and
54.2% in four years. This suggests a negative relationship between job tenure and job
mobility decisions; in line with a previous finding by Eriksson & Westergaard-Nielsen
(2009). Overall, non-relocated firms and those that relocated within a short distance
experience a lower rate of worker turnover than firms that relocated more than 3 km away
(see Table 2).
The average survival and turnover rates also exhibit a similar pattern over a coarser
category of relocation distance (see Table 2). The cumulative survival rate declined over
time as more and more workers moved jobs. On average, the cumulative survival rate is
5A t-test for the equality of the two means is rejected. Besides the t-test, we also apply propensity
score matching method (by matching the two groups based on pre-relocation characteristics) and find no
significant difference.
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Table 2: Average worker turnover and survival rates by relocation status and distance
Worker turnover rate Cumulative survival rate
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Non-relocated firms 0.209 0.181 0.166 0.157 0.791 0.65 0.544 0.459
Relocated firms where relocation distance is
less than 1km 0.219 0.199 0.172 0.172 0.781 0.629 0.520 0.431
between 1 – 5 km 0.216 0.193 0.184 0.161 0.784 0.635 0.520 0.434
between 5 – 10 km 0.229 0.200 0.173 0.173 0.771 0.624 0.518 0.424
between 10 – 20 km 0.226 0.236 0.205 0.163 0.774 0.597 0.479 0.404
between 20 – 50 km 0.244 0.224 0.163 0.172 0.756 0.596 0.496 0.408
over 50 km 0.281 0.320 0.303 0.273 0.719 0.500 0.353 0.231
Overall 0.210 0.181 0.166 0.157 0.790 0.650 0.543 0.458
higher for non-relocated firms and firms relocated within a shorter distance than those
that relocated farther way. For instance, after four years, firms that had relocated over
50 km kept only 23% of their workers in the base year compared to the 41% for firms
relocated between 20-50 km and 46% for non-relocated firms.
Table 3: Average pre-relocation characteristics of workers who stayed at relocated firms
Pre-relocation Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Average commuting (km) 18.53 17.80 18.80 17.94 17.92
Average experience (years) 18.84 20.22 20.97 21.70 22.44
Share completing higher education (%) 33.30 33.40 33.20 33.10 32.60
Share having children (%) 20.90 18.20 17.90 17.20 15.80
Share of male workers (%) 54.80 55.30 55.50 55.30 56.00
To investigate whether workers who leave differ from those who stay, we compare the
characteristics of workers in relocated firms prior to relocation against the pre-relocation
characteristics of workers who stayed after relocation. This is shown in Table 3. The
average commuting distance of stayers has declined, albeit non-smoothly, as more and
more long distance commuters left after relocation. In contrast, the average experience of
stayers has increased as a higher share of more experienced workers stayed after relocation.
Moreover, fewer female workers and those having children have stayed after the relocation.
In general, there seems to be some systematic difference between workers who stay and
those who leave in the aftermath of firm relocation.
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4 Estimation results and discussion
4.1 Estimation
Let di,t ≥ 0 be firm i’s relocation distance in a base year t such that di,t > 0 if firm i
had relocated or zero otherwise. We model the rate of worker turnover with the following
general linear model:
ri,s = αs + βsdi,t + θ′sxi,t + εi,s (2)
where x is a vector of firm-level base year characteristics; ε is the error term; α, β, and θ
are parameters of the model. Since the response variable is continuous, one can estimate
the model in (2) using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. The set of additional
covariates, xi,t, includes the number of workers as a measure of firm size; average experience
of workers and share of workers with higher education as a measure of skill intensity, the
industry in which the firm operates, the average commuting distance of workers, the share
of male workers and those having children. The level of most of these variables represent
the values of the respective variable at the beginning of a base year, i.e., before the firm’s
potential relocation.
We estimate the model on a combined sample of relocated and non-relocated firms
by including a dummy indicator for firm relocation. This way we can examine if firm
relocation has an effect on its own after controlling for the distance of relocation. Besides
other covariates, the model also includes year dummies to account for the effect of general
economic performance and labour market conditions on worker turnover. This is so since
more workers voluntary leave their jobs during boom or in periods of low unemployment
(Frederiksen & Westergaard-Nielsen, 2007; Eriksson & Westergaard-Nielsen, 2009). The
model also includes workplace municipality dummies to account for differences across
regions such as the size and feature of local labour and product markets. Moreover, since
firms in the same municipality share various common characteristics, they may tend to
experience similar rates of worker turnover. We account for the effect of this on standard
errors by clustering them by municipality. We have also included industry dummies.
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4.2 Results from the OLS model
Estimation results from an ordinary least square model are summarised in Table 4. The
first column contains results from a model in which the response variable is worker turnover
rate in the base year (year 0). The next three columns display estimation results in a
model where the response variable is the rate of worker turnover in successive years after
the base year. In general, estimates show that the rate of worker turnover is higher at
longer distance of relocation. The estimate of relocation distance is statistically significant
except in year 3. The effect of relocation distance is smaller in the base year. It becomes
stronger in the next two years after which, it faded away and becomes insignificant.
The estimated effect for the base year shows that a 10 km increase in a firm’s relocation
distance, on average, increases the rate of worker turnover by 0.4 percentage points, which
represents 2% of the average annual rate of worker turnover for non-relocated firms, or
alternatively a 0.5% reduction in survival rate. The effect of relocation distance in the
base year, as well as in subsequent years, depends on the amount of time workers require
to adjust to the change in workplace location. The adjustment period, in turn, depends on
whether workers knew about relocation decisions ahead of the actual relocation, availability
of alternative jobs, and the cost of job search and residence moves. Bearing in mind that
some firms could have relocated later in the base year such that workers in these firms
have had relatively short time to conform to the change, the estimated effect of relocation
distance in the base year could suggest prior knowledge of relocation decisions and/or
easier access to other jobs. To the extent that workers learn about the relocation at the
time when it occurs, the estimated effect in the base year is likely to be understated.
As expected, the effect of relocation distance is stronger in year 1; it is over double the
effect in the base year. The estimate suggests that a 10 km increase in relocation distance
increases the exit rate of workers who stayed in the base year by 1.1%. In terms of the
number of workers prior to relocation, this translates to an increase in worker turnover
by 0.9 percentage points.6 The relatively stronger effect in this year is not surprising
since, with longer search period, more and more workers will be able to find and move
to other jobs. The coefficient estimate of relocation distance in year 2 is significant and
6This is found by multiplying the coefficient estimate in year 1 by the average proportion of workers
who did not move jobs during the base year.
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Table 4: Estimation results from a standard regression model
Dependent variable is the rate of worker turnover in:
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Relocation distance (km) 0.00043** 0.00114*** 0.00105* 0.00046
(0.00021) (0.00041) (0.00059) (0.00033)
Relocation indicator (=1 if relocated) -0.00155 0.00575 0.00458 0.00242
(0.00334) (0.00379) (0.00558) (0.00455)
Number of workers 0.00001 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00004***
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Average experience of workers (years) -0.01525*** -0.01243*** -0.01071*** -0.00887***
(0.00059) (0.00060) (0.00059) (0.00061)
Share of workers having children -0.01585*** -0.03194*** -0.04328*** -0.05392***
(0.00610) (0.00641) (0.00629) (0.00733)
Average commute of workers (km) 0.00106*** 0.00073*** 0.00057*** 0.00054***
(0.00009) (0.00010) (0.00008) (0.00009)
Share of workers with higher education -0.06118*** -0.05214*** -0.04849*** -0.04605***
(0.00215) (0.00200) (0.00197) (0.00232)
Manufacturing or construction sector 0.03130*** 0.02463*** 0.01691*** 0.01189***
(0.00255) (0.00207) (0.00216) (0.00254)
Change in total employment -0.00107*** -0.00013*** -0.00008** -0.00010***
(0.00022) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00003)
Share of male workers -0.04707*** -0.03285*** -0.02921*** -0.03222***
(0.00380) (0.00400) (0.00370) (0.00455)
Constant 0.50265*** 0.40313*** 0.37700*** 0.70395***
(0.01163) (0.01064) (0.00993) (0.01113)
Observations 86,877 71,870 57,760 44,503
R-squared 0.17 0.09 0.071 0.058
In parenthesis are std. errors clustered by municipality. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Each model includes year and municipality fixed effects.
comparable to that in year 1. In year 3, the estimated effect does not only fade away but
also it becomes insignificant. This suggest that workers have adjusted to the relocation in
the first three years.
Is the cumulative effect in two or three years significant? We compute the standard
error of the cumulative effect in two and in three years assuming rates of worker turnover
are independent. This is a rather a strong assumption made only to provide a picture of
the cumulative effect. The standard error of the sum of the coefficients turns out to be
0.00046 in the first two years, and 0.00075 in the first three years. In each case, the sum
of the coefficients is more than double the respective standard error indicating that the
cumulative effects is statistically significant.
Although significant and positive as expected, the estimated effect of relocation distance
on worker turnover is rather moderate considering the average commuting distance of
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employed individuals in Denmark.7 It is not surprising that we obtained a lower effect
since (a) the high rate of job mobility in Denmark means that workers expect to be mobile
in the labour market; hence, it may matter less when their firm relocates; (b) if workers
knew about the relocation earlier and moved before it took place, the effect would not be
captured in our analysis.
However, the estimated effect can also be underestimated due to several reasons: First,
random error in our measure of relocation distance can attenuate the estimated effect. This
is likely to be the case since our measure of relocation distance is not accurate. Second,
if relocation induced many workers to leave such that less than 10 stayed subsequently,
then this firm is not included in the analysis since we considered firms that have at least
10 workers in any given year in the sample. To the extent that this was the case, the
estimated effect represents a lower bound. Thirdly, since employers can contemplate the
effect of relocation on their workers, they may not move to the extent that they would
lose their best employees. This self-selection can partly explain the small estimated effect.
Moreover, wages are likely to be correlated with both relocation distance (since firms
may offer compensation for commuting) and worker turnover (as higher wages induce
tenure). However, we do not control for wage in our model. Hence, it possible that we
have obtained a lower estimate than if we had controlled for wages.
Interestingly, the coefficient estimates associated with the relocation indicator are
not significant suggesting that, conditional on covariates in the model, both relocated
and non-relocated firms have experienced comparable worker turnover. It indicates that
relocation distance is not subsuming the effect of the spatial relocation per se. Moreover,
results from a model estimated based on a sample of firms relocated within 3 km distance
(see Table 10 in Appendix) show that the coefficient estimate of relocation distance has
become negative and often insignificant. This indicates that, for firms that move within
short distance, relocation distance does not significantly explain worker turnover rates.
Besides relocation distance and a dummy indicating relocation, the model also include
firm size to examine if larger firms can maintain lower worker turnover due to their
capacity to pay competitive wages. Although the coefficient estimate of firm size (number
7Figures from Statistics Denmark indicate that more than 90% of employed individuals in the country
commute less than 50 km one way; and more than a third of these individuals commute less than 10 km
one way.
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of workers) turned out to be positive, contradicting past evidence (e.g. Idson, 1993), the
estimate is negligible in magnitude. Another control variable in the model is the average
commuting distance of workers at a firm. The estimate of this variable is significant and
positive indicating that, on average, firms that are located farther from their employees
face higher worker turnover. Interestingly, this coefficient is in the same order of magnitude
as the respective coefficient of relocation distance indicating that firms located farther
away from their workers have experienced higher rate of worker turnover.
Results also suggest that firms that had more experienced workers faced lower worker
turnover. This result can indicate a better worker-firm match prior to relocation. More
experienced workers may seek to remain at their current job as they may have settled
after several job moves early in their career. Alternatively, the estimate can suggest that
a firm pays higher wages to senior workers to prevent them from leaving. Results also
show that, a firm that has a higher proportion of its workers as parents experienced lower
worker turnover. This result could indicate restrictions parents face in moving residences
(Munch et al. , 2008).
Worker turnover could vary across industries. Workers in certain sectors are educated
and trained to have easily transferable skills, which enhances worker turnover. This is
specially the case in manufacturing and construction industries. Our estimates support
this indicating that, compared to firms in other industries, those in manufacturing and
construction industries experienced significantly higher rates of worker turnover.
Firms with a higher percentage of highly educated workers can have higher or lower
turnover. While workers with higher education can perform tasks requiring lower skills,
they may however have limited alternative employers in their specialised skill and may be
more reluctant to accept other jobs that are less favourable. We included as controls the
percentage of workers completing short, medium and long-cycle higher education and those
with bachelor and PhD degrees. The associated coefficient is negative and significant.
Involuntary separations are more likely to be the case if a firm is downsizing than
otherwise. One can account for downsizing by including in the model the number of
workers at a firm in subsequent years. However, the number of workers in the base year is
highly correlated with the number of workers in subsequent years. Instead, we include
the change in total employment, the difference in the number of workers at a firm in
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the current year and that in the previous year. The associated coefficient estimate is,
as expected, significant suggesting that the survival rate is lower if a firm is downsizing
than otherwise. By doing this, we isolate the effect of relocation associated with up- or
downscaling from that induced by the relocation distance thereof.
4.3 Results from a fractional logit model
The dependent variable in our analysis is a proportion measuring the fraction of workers
separating from their firm from one (base) year to subsequent years. Therefore, it only
assumes values between zero and one inclusive. Though one can use an OLS method
to model the fraction of separations, as we did above, this method does not recognize
the bounded nature of the response variable. As a result, there is no guarantee that the
predicted worker turnover rates fall within the zero-one bound. A Tobit model would be
a better option since it acknowledges the zero lower bound. Nevertheless, as Papke &
Wooldridge (1996) argued, the Tobit model might not be applicable where values below
the censoring point, in our case zero, are infeasible.
The fractional logit model proposed by Papke & Wooldridge (1996) is more suited for
this particular purpose. The model is estimated using a Generalised Linear Model (GLM),
in which the conditional mean is assumed to follow a logistic distribution. The model in
(1) is estimated using a fractional logit model, and Table 5 shows the average marginal
effects from this model. Overall, the average partial effects from this model are comparable
to the corresponding marginal effects from the standard linear regression model. For the
target variable, the average marginal effects from the fractional logit model are 24-39%
lower than the corresponding marginal affects under OLS. The pattern of estimated effects
is also similar: the effect is strongest in year 1 and year 2, and it declines and become
insignificant in year 3.
Estimated marginal effects of the remaining covariates in this model are, in most cases,
similar to the corresponding marginal effects from the linear model. A noticeable exception
is the coefficient estimate of the relocation indicator in year 1: contrary to the linear
model, the estimate in this model is statistically significant. In general, however, results
are largely similar under the two models; thus, we continue to use OLS estimates for ease
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Table 5: Average partial effects from a fractional logit model
Dependent variable is the rate of worker turnover in:
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Relocation distance (km) 0.00026* 0.00083*** 0.00076** 0.00035
(0.00015) (0.00029) (0.00038) (0.00026)
Relocation indicator (=1 if relocated) -0.00079 0.00672*** 0.00573 0.00282
(0.00302) (0.00332) (0.00497) (0.00424)
Number of workers -0.00003*** 0.00002*** 0.00003*** 0.00003***
(0.00001) (0.000001) (0.00001) (0.000001)
Average experience of workers (years) -0.01448*** -0.01170*** -0.01008*** -0.00841***
(0.00046) (0.00044) (0.00046) (0.00049)
Share of workers having children -0.00669 -0.02502*** -0.03753*** -0.04982***
(0.00593) (0.00677) (0.00661) (0.00737)
Average commute of workers (km) 0.00096*** 0.00070*** 0.00056*** 0.00053***
(0.00009) (0.00010) (0.00008) (0.00008)
Share of workers with higher education -0.06145*** -0.05473*** -0.05078*** -0.04801***
(0.00185) (0.00204) (0.00194) (0.00233)
Manufacturing or construction sector 0.03026*** 0.02454*** 0.01731*** 0.01271***
(0.00220) (0.00194) (0.00204) (0.00253)
Change in total employment -0.00206*** -0.00010*** -0.00006*** -0.00007***
(0.00024) (0.00005) (0.00003) (0.00002)
Share of male workers -0.04714*** -0.03337** -0.02960*** -0.03250***
(0.00339) (0.00391) (0.00360) (0.00452)
Observations 86877 71870 57760 44503
In parenthesis are std. errors clustered by municipality. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Each model includes year and municipality fixed effects.
of interpretation.
5 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we examine how much results in the previous section depend on some
issues that can potentially affect the estimated effect. This includes probing the effect of
outlier information about changes in commuting distance on our results; and examining if
results vary by selection of the sample based on firm size.
Robustness of the measure of relocation distance
Since we compute relocation distance based on the largest absolute change in the commuting
distance for workers who did not move job and residence, it can be sensitive to outlier
information on changes in commutes. That is, relocation distance can change if we
exclude one or more workers who stayed with the firm and experienced largest changes
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in commuting distance. To examine how much this affects our results, we estimate the
model by excluding some workers who did not move job and residence and faced the
largest absolute change in commuting distance. Table 6 shows coefficient estimates for the
target variable; detailed estimation results are given in Table 11 through to Table 15 in
the Appendix.
Table 6: The coefficient of relocation distance computed after excluding some workers who
did not change job and residence, and faced largest changes in commuting distance
Relocation distance calculated after Estimate of β where the dependent
excluding commutes of workers who did variable is worker turnover rate in:
not move job & residence and faced the: Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
– largest change in commuting distance 0.00036 0.00146*** 0.00114 0.00031
(0.00022) (0.00050) (0.00071) (0.00035)
– two largest changes in commuting distance 0.00034 0.00152*** 0.00122* 0.00033
(0.00024) (0.00051) (0.00073) (0.00037)
– three largest changes in commuting distance 0.00034 0.00153*** 0.00127* 0.00034
(0.00025) (0.00052) (0.00075) (0.00038)
– four largest changes in commuting distance 0.00035 0.00154*** 0.00130* 0.00035
(0.00025) (0.00053) (0.00076) (0.00039)
– five largest changes in commuting distance 0.00035 0.00155*** 0.00133* 0.00037
(0.00025) (0.00054) (0.00077) (0.00040)
In parenthesis are std. errors clustered by municipality. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Each model includes year and municipality fixed effects.
Estimates and their standard errors remained largely comparable indicating the robust-
ness of our results to outlier information on the measure of relocation distance. This is not
surprising since relocation distance hardly changes despite the exclusion of largest changes
in commuting distance of workers who did not move job and residences. In contrast to
results in the previous section, the estimated effect in the base year is significant only at
the 15% level and about 16% lower.
Do our results vary if the sample only involves firms with more workers?
Our analysis so far is based on a sample of firms with at least 10 workers in each year in
the sample period. We also examine whether our results change if we estimate the model
based on a sample of larger firms. Estimation results from a model based on a subsample
of firms with at least 15 and 30 workers in a given year in the sample is shown in Table 7
(detailed estimation results are shown in Table 16 and Table 17 in the Appendix). Despite
some dissimilarity in the size of estimates and their standard errors, results are generally
97
comparable. The cumulative effect over three years is the same as before. A surprising
result is the negative coefficient estimate in year 2 for a subsample of firms with at least
30 workers in a given year. This coefficient is however only marginally significant.
Table 7: Firms with at least 15 or 30 workers in any given year in the sample
Estimate of β where the dependent
variable is worker turnover rate in:
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Firms with 15 or more workers in a given year 0.00041* 0.00108*** 0.00040 0.00069**
(0.00021) (0.00037) (0.00046) (0.00035)
Firms with 30 or more workers in a given year 0.00060 0.00151*** -0.00042* 0.00057
(0.00041) (0.00055) (0.00021) (0.00043)
In parenthesis are std. errors clustered by municipality. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Each model includes the full set of covariates and year
and municipality fixed effects.
6 Conclusion
Using Danish register data for the year 2000-2007, this study investigates the extent to
which the relocation distance of moving firms affects worker turnover at the firm level. The
empirical results in the paper show that relocation distance has a moderate but significant
effect on worker turnover: e.g., a 10 km increase in relocation distance increases the average
annual rate of worker turnover at the firm level by 2-4 percent in three years, including the
year of relocation. The effect is smaller in the year of relocation; and becomes relatively
stronger in the next two years before it eventually fades away as workers adjust to the
change. The implication of these results is that, if or when employers decide to change
workplace location, they ought to contemplate the effect of the relocation distance on the
commutes of their workers and the resultant loss in human power. The findings in this
study corroborate results in previous research (e.g. Zax & Kain, 1996; Levinson, 1997; van
Ommeren et al. , 1999) that establish a link between commuting distance and job moving
behaviour.
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Appendix
Table 8: Average worker turnover rates by year and distance of relocation
Year
Overall
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Non-relocated 0.199 0.205 0.202 0.2 0.197 0.217 0.249 0.209
Year 0 Relocated within 3 km 0.194 0.215 0.205 0.208 0.198 0.224 0.254 0.216
Relocated over 3 km 0.245 0.222 0.238 0.2 0.205 0.241 0.259 0.232
Non-relocated 0.135 0.131 0.132 0.131 0.147 0.168 0.14
Year 1 Relocated within 3 km 0.145 0.133 0.138 0.146 0.165 0.176 0.15
Relocated over 3 km 0.137 0.156 0.154 0.162 0.183 0.185 0.161
Non-relocated 0.153 0.152 0.152 0.171 0.201 0.166
Year 2 Relocated within 3 km 0.142 0.181 0.16 0.178 0.215 0.173
Relocated over 3 km 0.169 0.182 0.189 0.212 0.245 0.193
Non-relocated 0.14 0.141 0.159 0.19 0.157
Year 3 Relocated within 3 km 0.132 0.153 0.15 0.21 0.163
Relocated over 3 km 0.161 0.175 0.173 0.207 0.179
Table 9: Summary of the rate of worker turnover by distance of relocation
Observations Minimum Median Mean Std deviation Maximum
Non-relocated 86,172 0 0.188 0.209 0.130 1.000
Year 0 Relocated < 3 km 1,052 0 0.196 0.216 0.139 1.000
Relocated ≥ 3 km 760 0 0.214 0.232 0.132 0.778
Non-relocated 71,348 0 0.158 0.181 0.128 1.000
Year 1 Relocated < 3 km 887 0 0.171 0.194 0.133 0.800
Relocated ≥ 3 km 649 0 0.188 0.219 0.156 1.000
Non-relocated 57,559 0 0.143 0.166 0.130 1.000
Year 2 Relocated < 3 km 679 0 0.147 0.173 0.138 1.000
Relocated ≥ 3 km 464 0 0.154 0.193 0.169 1.000
Non-relocated 44,406 0 0.133 0.157 0.135 1.000
Year 3 Relocated < 3 km 548 0 0.133 0.163 0.143 0.886
Relocated ≥ 3 km 389 0 0.154 0.178 0.140 0.850
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Table 10: Estimates based of a sample of firms with relocation distance < 3 km
Dependent variable is the rate of worker turnover in:
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Relocation distance (km) -0.00762 -0.00614 -0.00377 -0.01435*
(0.00619) (0.00447) (0.00564) (0.00793)
Relocation indicator (=1 if relocated) 0.00702 0.01406*** 0.00821 0.01389
(0.00799) (0.00513) (0.00829) (0.00989)
Number of workers 0.00001 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00004***
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Average experience of workers (years) -0.01526*** -0.01240*** -0.01068*** -0.00892***
(0.00059) (0.00060) (0.00056) (0.00059)
Share of workers having children -0.01562** -0.03072*** -0.04166*** -0.05451***
(0.00607) (0.00638) (0.00643) (0.00735)
Average commute of workers (km) 0.00107*** 0.00073*** 0.00057*** 0.00054***
(0.00010) (0.00011) (0.00008) (0.00009)
Share of workers with higher education -0.06109*** -0.05214*** -0.04851*** -0.04655***
(0.00215) (0.00198) (0.00195) (0.00233)
Manufacturing or construction sector 0.03120*** 0.02456*** 0.01670*** 0.01187***
(0.00256) (0.00203) (0.00215) (0.00249)
Change in total employment -0.00108*** -0.00013*** -0.00009*** -0.00010***
(0.00022) (0.00004) (0.00003) (0.00003)
Share of male workers -0.04712*** -0.03289*** -0.02926*** -0.03249***
(0.00383) (0.00398) (0.00365) (0.00458)
Constant 0.46866*** 0.36622*** 0.35318*** 0.70528***
(0.01247) (0.01195) (0.00996) (0.01084)
Observations 86,128 71,230 57,303 44,119
R-squared 0.170 0.089 0.071 0.058
In parenthesis are std. errors clustered by municipality. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Each model includes year and municipality fixed effects.
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Table 11: Estimates after excluding the largest absolute change in commuting distance
Dependent variable is the rate of worker turnover in:
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Relocation distance (km) 0.00036 0.00146*** 0.00114 0.00031
(0.00022) (0.00050) (0.00071) (0.00035)
Relocation indicator (=1 if relocated) -0.00062 0.00543 0.00567 0.00397
(0.00323) (0.00367) (0.00542) (0.00442)
Number of workers 0.00001 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00004***
(0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Average experience of workers (years) -0.01525*** -0.01243*** -0.01071*** -0.00887***
(0.00059) (0.00060) (0.00059) (0.00061)
Share of workers having children -0.01586*** -0.03196*** -0.04330*** -0.05391***
(0.00610) (0.00642) (0.00629) (0.00733)
Average commute of workers (km) 0.00106*** 0.00073*** 0.00057*** 0.00054***
(0.00009) (0.00010) (0.00008) (0.00009)
Share of workers with higher education -0.06118*** -0.05212*** -0.04846*** -0.04603***
(0.00215) (0.00200) (0.00196) (0.00232)
Manufacturing or construction sector 0.03131*** 0.02459*** 0.01690*** 0.01188***
(0.00255) (0.00207) (0.00216) (0.00255)
Change in total employment -0.00107*** -0.00012*** -0.00008* -0.00010***
(0.00022) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00003)
Share of male workers -0.04706*** -0.03282*** -0.02918*** -0.03222***
(0.00380) (0.00400) (0.00371) (0.00456)
Constant 0.50316*** 0.40163*** 0.37746*** 0.70385***
(0.01162) (0.01060) (0.00991) (0.01114)
Observations 86,877 71,870 57,760 44,503
R-squared 0.170 0.090 0.071 0.058
In parenthesis are std. errors clustered by municipality. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Each model includes year and municipality fixed effects.
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Table 12: Estimates after excluding 2 largest absolute changes in commuting distance
Dependent variable is the rate of worker turnover in:
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Relocation distance (km) 0.00034 0.00152*** 0.00122* 0.00033
(0.00024) (0.00051) (0.00073) (0.00037)
Relocation indicator (=1 if relocated) -0.00040 0.00552 0.00552 0.00393
(0.00325) (0.00366) (0.00537) (0.00442)
Number of workers 0.00001 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00004***
(0.00001) (0.000001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Average experience of workers (years) -0.01525*** -0.01243*** -0.01071*** -0.00887***
(0.00059) (0.00060) (0.00059) (0.00061)
Share of workers having children -0.01586*** -0.03194*** -0.04330*** -0.05391***
(0.00610) (0.00642) (0.00629) (0.00733)
Average commute of workers (km) 0.00106*** 0.00073*** 0.00057*** 0.00054***
(0.00009) (0.00010) (0.00008) (0.00009)
Share of workers with higher education -0.06118*** -0.05212*** -0.04846*** -0.04603***
(0.00215) (0.00200) (0.00196) (0.00232)
Manufacturing or construction sector 0.03131*** 0.02460*** 0.01691*** 0.01189***
(0.00255) (0.00207) (0.00216) (0.00255)
Change in total employment -0.00107*** -0.00012*** -0.00008* -0.00010***
(0.00022) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00003)
Share of male workers -0.04707*** -0.03282*** -0.02918*** -0.03222***
(0.00380) (0.00400) (0.00371) (0.00456)
Constant 0.50313*** 0.40361*** 0.37750*** 0.70385***
(0.01162) (0.01069) (0.00990) (0.01114)
Observations 86,877 71,870 57,760 44,503
R-squared 0.17 0.09 0.071 0.058
In parenthesis are std. errors clustered by municipality. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Each model includes year and municipality fixed effects.
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Table 13: Estimates after excluding 3 largest absolute changes in commuting distance
Dependent variable is the rate of worker turnover in:
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Relocation distance (km) 0.00034 0.00153*** 0.00127* 0.00034
(0.00025) (0.00052) (0.00075) (0.00038)
Relocation indicator (=1 if relocated) -0.00035 0.00570 0.00548 0.00396
(0.00325) (0.00367) (0.00536) (0.00441)
Number of workers 0.00001 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00004***
(0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Average experience of workers (years) -0.01525*** -0.01243*** -0.01071*** -0.00887***
(0.00059) (0.00060) (0.00059) (0.00061)
Share of workers having children -0.01586*** -0.03193*** -0.04329*** -0.05390***
(0.00610) (0.00642) (0.00629) (0.00733)
Average commute of workers (km) 0.00106*** 0.00073*** 0.00057*** 0.00054***
(0.00009) (0.00010) (0.00008) (0.00009)
Share of workers with higher education -0.06118*** -0.05212*** -0.04846*** -0.04603***
(0.00215) (0.00200) (0.00196) (0.00232)
Manufacturing or construction sector 0.03131*** 0.02461*** 0.01691*** 0.01189***
(0.00255) (0.00207) (0.00216) (0.00255)
Change in total employment -0.00107*** -0.00012*** -0.00008* -0.00010***
(0.00022) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00003)
Share of male workers -0.04707*** -0.03282*** -0.02918*** -0.03222***
(0.00380) (0.00400) (0.00371) (0.00456)
Constant 0.50312*** 0.40086*** 0.37736*** 0.70385***
(0.01162) (0.01058) (0.00990) (0.01114)
Observations 86,877 71,870 57,760 44,503
R-squared 0.17 0.09 0.071 0.058
In parenthesis are std. errors clustered by municipality. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Each model includes year and municipality fixed effects.
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Table 14: Estimates after excluding 4 largest absolute changes in commuting distance
Dependent variable is the rate of worker turnover in:
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Relocation distance (km) 0.00035 0.00154*** 0.00130* 0.00035
(0.00025) (0.00053) (0.00076) (0.00039)
Relocation indicator (=1 if relocated) -0.00034 0.00591 0.00552 0.00393
(0.00324) (0.00365) (0.00532) (0.00440)
Number of workers 0.00001 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00004***
(0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Average experience of workers (years) -0.01525*** -0.01243*** -0.01071*** -0.00887***
(0.00059) (0.00060) (0.00059) (0.00061)
Share of workers having children -0.01586*** -0.03193*** -0.04330*** -0.05390***
(0.00610) (0.00642) (0.00629) (0.00733)
Average commute of workers (km) 0.00106*** 0.00073*** 0.00057*** 0.00054***
(0.00009) (0.00010) (0.00008) (0.00009)
Share of workers with higher education -0.06118*** -0.05212*** -0.04847*** -0.04603***
(0.00215) (0.00200) (0.00196) (0.00232)
Manufacturing or construction sector 0.03131*** 0.02461*** 0.01691*** 0.01189***
(0.00255) (0.00207) (0.00216) (0.00255)
Change in total employment -0.00107*** -0.00012*** -0.00008* -0.00010***
(0.00022) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00003)
Share of male workers -0.04706*** -0.03282*** -0.02917*** -0.03222***
(0.00380) (0.00400) (0.00371) (0.00456)
Constant 0.50310*** 0.40296*** 0.37740*** 0.70386***
(0.01162) (0.01065) (0.00990) (0.01114)
Observations 86,877 71,870 57,760 44,503
R-squared 0.17 0.09 0.071 0.058
In parenthesis are std. errors clustered by municipality. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Each model includes year and municipality fixed effects.
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Table 15: Estimates after excluding 5 largest absolute changes in commuting distance
Dependent variable is the rate of worker turnover in:
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Relocation distance (km) 0.00035 0.00155*** 0.00133* 0.00037
(0.00025) (0.00054) (0.00077) (0.0004)
Relocation indicator (=1 if relocated) -0.00032 0.00607* 0.00558 0.00389
(0.00323) (0.00362) (0.00529) (0.00439)
Number of workers 0.00001 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00004***
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Average experience of workers (years) -0.01525*** -0.01243*** -0.01071*** -0.00887***
(0.00059) (0.0006) (0.00059) (0.00061)
Share of workers having children -0.01586*** -0.03193*** -0.04330*** -0.05391***
(0.0061) (0.00642) (0.00629) (0.00733)
Average commute of workers (km) 0.00106*** 0.00073*** 0.00057*** 0.00054***
(0.00009) (0.0001) (0.00008) (0.00009)
Share of workers with higher education -0.06118*** -0.05212*** -0.04846*** -0.04603***
(0.00215) (0.002) (0.00196) (0.00232)
Manufacturing or construction sector 0.03131*** 0.02461*** 0.01691*** 0.01188***
(0.00255) (0.00207) (0.00216) (0.00255)
Change in total employment -0.00107*** -0.00012*** -0.00008* -0.00010***
(0.00022) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00003)
Share of male workers -0.04706*** -0.03282*** -0.02917*** -0.03222***
(0.0038) (0.004) (0.00371) (0.00456)
Constant 0.50315*** 0.40055*** 0.37747*** 0.70386***
(0.01162) (0.01057) (0.00989) (0.01114)
Observations 86,877 71,870 57,760 44,503
R-squared 0.170 0.090 0.071 0.058
In parenthesis are std. errors clustered by municipality. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Each model includes year and municipality fixed effects.
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Table 16: Estimates based on a sample of firms with 15 or more workers in a year
Dependent variable is the rate of worker turnover in:
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Relocation distance (km) 0.00041* 0.00108*** 0.00040 0.00069**
(0.00021) (0.00037) (0.00046) (0.00035)
Relocation indicator (=1 if relocated) 0.00230 0.00538 0.00670 -0.00137
(0.00407) (0.00363) (0.00501) (0.00500)
Number of employees 0.00001 0.00002*** 0.00003*** 0.00003***
(0.00001) (0.000001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Average experience of workers (years) -0.01554*** -0.01266*** -0.01052*** -0.00955***
(0.00047) (0.00053) (0.00058) (0.00068)
Number of workers having children -0.02128*** -0.03829*** -0.04066*** -0.06327***
(0.00698) (0.00757) (0.00835) (0.00957)
Average commute of workers (km) 0.00102*** 0.00075*** 0.00057*** 0.00048***
(0.00013) (0.00014) (0.00012) (0.00012)
Share completing higher education -0.06369*** -0.05507*** -0.05167*** -0.04987***
(0.00196) (0.00202) (0.00190) (0.00228)
Manufacturing or construction sector 0.03356*** 0.02659*** 0.01865*** 0.01550***
(0.00265) (0.00203) (0.00198) (0.00246)
Change in total employment -0.00097*** -0.00010*** -0.00009** -0.00010***
(0.00020) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00003)
Share of male workers -0.05020*** -0.03694*** -0.03438*** -0.03777***
(0.00429) (0.00444) (0.00411) (0.00478)
Constant 0.51183*** 0.42322*** 0.35048*** 0.37198***
-0.00872 -0.01032 -0.01067 -0.01282
Observations 60,136 49,888 40,192 31,019
R-squared 0.200 0.109 0.088 0.077
In parenthesis are std. errors clustered by municipality. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Each model includes year and municipality fixed effects.
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Table 17: Estimates based on a sample of firms with 30 or more workers in a year
Dependent variable is the rate of worker turnover in:
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Relocation distance (km) 0.00060 0.00151*** -0.00042* 0.00057
(0.00041) (0.00055) (0.00021) (0.00043)
Dummy for relocation 0.00439 0.00104 0.00494 0.00282
(0.00581) (0.00568) (0.00511) (0.00670)
Number of employees 0.00002*** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.00002***
(0.000001) (0.000001) (0.000001) (0.000001)
Average experience of workers (years) -0.01557*** -0.01314*** -0.01096*** -0.00865***
(0.00062) (0.00067) (0.00064) (0.00060)
Number of workers having children -0.03292** -0.05049*** -0.04753*** -0.05735***
(0.01440) (0.01751) (0.01274) (0.01130)
Average commute of workers (km) 0.00106*** 0.00063*** 0.00047*** 0.00047***
(0.00018) (0.00016) (0.00016) (0.00015)
Share completing higher education -0.07261*** -0.06395*** -0.06107*** -0.05872***
(0.00270) (0.00296) (0.00312) (0.00336)
Manufacturing or construction sector 0.02920*** 0.02234*** 0.01395*** 0.01321***
(0.00338) (0.00325) (0.00334) (0.00397)
Change in total employment -0.00093*** -0.00011*** -0.00001 -0.00005*
(0.00010) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00003)
Share of male workers -0.05026*** -0.03273*** -0.03109*** -0.03594***
(0.00578) (0.00638) (0.00751) (0.00829)
Constant 0.47880*** 0.39555*** 0.38369*** 0.29378***
(0.01247) (0.01401) (0.01266) (0.01187)
Observations 29,012 24,139 19,497 15,075
R-squared 0.262 0.140 0.117 0.102
In parenthesis are std. errors clustered by municipality. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Each model includes year and municipality fixed effects.
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